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Chapter 1
Introduction
“The necessity for collective rationality is no guarantee that it will obtain.”1 In fact, social
and especially economic life would be much easier if problems of collective action did
not abound. Underprovision of public goods, overuse of common pool resources, and
agency costs are well-known examples of economists’ discomfort when it comes to the
conflict of individual and collective rationality. Unlike in realms where Adam Smith’s
Invisible Hand can operate smoothly, the temptation for each individual to opportunisti-
cally pursue one’s own advantage at the expense of others is insufficiently kept in check
by market forces in these instances. In response, an important fraction of output in
modern industrialized economies is expended year after year to enforce taxes, secure
property rights andmonitor behavior at the workplace. The associated cost represents
a considerable deadweight loss: Resources could be saved and channelled toward gen-
uinely productive uses if agents could effectively refrain from opportunism and credibly
commit themselves to cooperative behavior. Everyone involved would then be better
off. Notwithstanding the significance of this type of ’transaction costs’ (as they might be
termed) in advanced economies, people in dysfunctional societies where corruption and
1Macy (1998), § 1.1, his italics
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nepotism reign marvel at the ’social capital’ that alleviates problems of collective action
and facilitates superior outcomes at least to a certain extent in successful economies. In
other words, institutions (understood in an informal sense which includes e. g. good
citizenship, the respect for property and the honoring of contractual agreements) are
natural candidates when it comes to the determinants of economic performance and
growth.
Empirical economists have of course taken up the task and confirmed the positive correla-
tion between economic performance of society and institutions of social capital. Among
the different dimensions of social capital, many studies highlight the role of personality
traits which enable individuals to trust one another in business dealings.2 The signifi-
cance of trust in the economic sphere resides in agents’ willingness to make themselves
vulnerable to the opportunism of their partners: Trusting individuals in a world that
dispenses with or cannot afford resource-consuming safeguards run the danger of being
cheated and exploited by untrustworthy partners — at least near the end of business
relationships. The precarious nature of trust as well as its efficiency implications have
always been an important topic in economics: In the words of Kenneth Arrow (1974, p.
23), “trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a
lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word. Unfortunately this is
not a commodity which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have
some doubts about what you’ve bought.” Systematic analyses of trust and trustworthiness
in economic contexts are thus called for, and game theory provides a range of formal-
izations for this endeavor. The Trust Game is offered as a model in which to appreciate
the core meaning of trust in an economic context, i. e. the jeopardy and the potential
involved in putting one’s material fate in the hands of somebody else. Yet rationality on
the part of both players in the basic Trust Game forces analysts into the prediction that
trust will not be honored and hence cannot be shown in the first place. Rational players’
incapacity to trust one anothermay be deplored bymany standards, yet what is important
2See e.g. Tabellini (2005, Table 12) who finds trust to be the single most important facet of “social
capital” in a cross-country growth regression.
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to economists are its sobering implications for economic outcomes. These are driven
home by the symmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma, which portrays the conflict of individual and
collective rationality in its most pronounced form. Individuals concerned with their own
welfare turn out as both untrustworthy andmistrustful as they try to exploit their partners
and at the same time protect themselves against being exploited. The result is a lock-in at
an inferior state of mutual defection despite the fact that all parties involved would prefer
an outcome of mutual cooperation where transactions are carried out smoothly.
Given the crucial importance of trust and other dimensions of social capital for the func-
tioning of social systems and economies, the predictions derived in the framework of
game theory are alarming. Fortunately, subjects in experimental game theorists’ laborato-
ries and in real-life transactions alike give proof of considerable endowments of social
capital each day. The piece of work at hand is about the age-old question of how theory
can accommodate this finding, the aim being twofold: In a first step, selected parts of
the literature on how the conflict of individual and collective rationality is studied in
economics and game theory will be reviewed along with the solutions proposed. Yet the
overwhelming majority of these solutions, which rely on repeated-game effects, do not to
apply when one wishes to adopt a scenario of — in the words of Douglass North (1984)
— “impersonal exchange”. The literature review hence sets the stage and is intended
tomotivate the contribution of the thesis: An argument will be proposed that religious
involvement may be taken as an example in a ’signaling’ approach to the evolution of
cooperation, where the aim is to understand the persistence of collectively beneficial
behavior in competitive settings which require — but do not favor — what Schlicht (2002)
calls ”anonymous trust”.
The exposition proceeds as follows: In chapter 2 it will be urged that the one-shot (as
opposed to the Iterated) Prisoners’ Dilemma lends itself to formalize problems of collec-
tive action in societies where interactions are sporadic, ruling out future punishments
for defective moves which might sustain cooperation as one of many Nash equilibria.
Referring to biologists’ understanding of the term, cooperation will be portrayed as al-
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truistic in this scenario. Multilevel (or ’group’) selection as a framework for studying the
evolution of altruism will be discussed and adopted in chapter 3. Selected pieces of the
literature on group selection enabled by assortative encounters (i. e. altruists tending
to associate and interact preferentially with each other) will be reviewed in chapter 4.
Adding to this literature, an ecological model of ’religious signaling’ will be proposed
in chapter 5. Religious involvement will be shown to possibly retain its signaling value
and sustain the evolution of altruistic cooperation in long-run equilibrium. Chapter 6
concludes.
Chapter 2
Game Theory and the Problem of
Collective Action
The theory of noncooperative games provides a natural framework for a theoretical
analysis of collective action problems. Players in a game decide on how to behave in a
situation of strategic interdependence, where the outcome is contingent on the strategies
pursued by themselves as well as by their opponents. Players’ behavior is modeled as
rational: When choosing among the different strategies at hand, players opt for strategies
which best serve their self-interest as given by a preference relation they have over the
different outcomes. Preferences and the rational nature of all decision-making in a game
are typically assumed to be common knowledge, meaning that each player knows the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility payoffs her opponents seek to maximize, and that
opponents know to be known to do so, and that a player knows about her opponents’
knowledge to be known to do so, ad infinitum. Common knowledge enables players to
inform themselves about how their opponents might behave, which they often need to do
because of the strategic nature of the interaction. Game theorists then try to determine
the outcome to be obtained when all players’ decisions are in equilibrium, meaning that
no one can by switching to a different strategy bring about an outcomewhich ranks higher
5
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according to their preference.
This chapter begins by reviewing the Trust Game, which is designed as a paradigmatic
representation of the precarious nature of trust in economic settings. Its implications
for collective action problems will be driven home by invoking the Prisoners’ Dilemma,
which abstracts from the sequentiality of moves and treats players symmetrically. The
canonical way of allowing for cooperative outcomes in the Prisoners’ Dilemma—repeated
play in idiosyncratic relationships — will be discussed and rejected not only because of
theoretical shortcomings but also as a solution for important collective action problems
arising inmodern large-scale societieswith high degrees of geographic and socialmobility:
When transactions take place in increasingly anonymous settings, the ’shadow of the
future’ cannot be invoked to sustain cooperative equilibria. This shifts attention back to
the one-shot case, where cooperating is a strictly dominated strategy never to be pursued
by rational players. The extensive evidence that sporadic interactions do not prevent
people from cooperating — neither in the laboratories of experimental game theorists
nor in the field— remains enigmatic in this regard and calls for an alternative approach.
2.1 Trust Game
In the introduction it was argued that trust is an important component of the ’social glue’
which fosters societies’ economic performance and success bymitigating collective action
problems associated with, e. g., asymmetric information or public goods.3 On an abstract
level, the economic issues inherent in trust are formalized in the Trust Game which was
adapted from the ’Centipede’ game (see e. g. Kreps 1990) and put to an experimental test
by— inter alia—Berg et al. (1995).
The basic Trust Game is played by two individuals. Player 1 has received a resource
3See James (2002) for a more exhaustive list of examples and references.
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endowment of E > 0, while player 2 has access to an investment project and is thus in a
position to augment the first player’s money. The two players move in two consecutive
stages. In the first stage, player 1 may decide to pass her endowment on to player 2 or
alternatively keep the endowment for herself. If player 1 keeps the money, the game
ends with earnings4 of E and 0 for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Stage 2 of the
game arises only if player 1 has handed over her endowment. Player 2 in this case has
an augmented amount of (1+ r )E > E at her hands and full discretion as to its use: In
particular, she is free to keep the augmented amount for herself, leaving player 1 with
zero earnings. Alternatively she can hand the original amount of E back to player 1 and
split the increment of rE in some way, e. g. keeping rE/2 for herself and paying the same
amount to player 1. Players are taken to be concerned only with earnings of their own,
preferring more income to less, when they evaluate the different outcomes of the game
andmake their choices.
Figure 2.1 shows the basic Trust Game described above in an extensive game tree repre-
sentation. This game is easily solved by backward induction: Were the second stage to
be reached, player 2 would choose to exploit player 1’s trust and keep the endowment
and the interest for herself, (1+ r )E > rE/2. Common knowledge enables player 1 to
anticipate player 2’s reasoning when making her choice in the first stage of the game.
Therefore she decides not to trust player 1 and contents herself with her endowment.
Otherwise she would lose her endowment and end up with resources of 0< E . The game
ends after the first stage with earnings of E for player 1 and 0 for player 2, despite the
fact that — by investing the endowment and splitting the returns, e. g. equally, among
the two individuals — player 1 could end up with (1+ r2E)> E and player 2 with r2E > 0.
Both players would prefer this outcome to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
’no trust’. The efficient outcome is however out of reach as players’ individual rationality
advises player 1 not to make herself vulnerable to an opportunistic move which player 2
4The term earnings, although not very common, is used here to emphasize that the matrix shows
players’ material (resource) incomes as opposed to utilities. This distinction will be important in the
context of the indirect evolutionary approach in section 5.1.
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Figure 2.1: Basic Trust Game
would find expedient.
2.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma
The Trust Game is of course not the only framework in which to study collective action
problems and their consequences. In the words of Cook et al. (2005), its special appeal
is that it captures the “core of an act of trust or trusting behavior - risk taking and thus
making oneself vulnerable.” (Their italics) The aspect of risk is however easily dealt with
by the first-moving player who can effortlessly predict her opponent’s untrustworthiness.
Players in the Trust Game are hence in a situation of Prisoners’ Dilemma, which succinctly
drives home perhaps not the core meaning but in any case the welfare implications of the
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cooperate defect
cooperate R S
defect T P
Figure 2.2: Prisoners’ Dilemma
problem of trust.5
Players in the Prisoners’ Dilemmamove simultaneously. Figure 2.2 gives resource earnings
for the row player, conditional on his choice to either cooperate or defect and the strategy
pursued by her opponent’s . Take earnings to satisfy T >R > P > S and 2R > T +S, where
the latter inequality makes sure that the Prisoners’ Dilemma is “pure” in the sense that
mutual cooperation maximizes aggregate earnings and from this point of view entails
efficiency. Agents’ preferences in a Prisoners’ Dilemma leave them with effectively no
choice but to defect, as it portrays an interaction where free rides on others’ efforts
unambiguously result in a net resource gain. As a result they prefer outcomes in which
they defect, regardless of whether their opponent cooperates or not: It is individually
as rational to exploit a cooperator as to protect oneself against getting exploited by a
defector. In terms of the previous discussion, players in a Prisoners’ Dilemma turn out as
untrustworthy andmistrustful at the same time. The dominant strategy equilibrium in
which both players defect immediately follows as the unique solution to this game, despite
the fact that both players would prefer the efficient outcome of mutual cooperation
yielding its fruit over mutual defection.
Defection being a dominant strategy, players in a Prisoners’ Dilemma can spare them-
selves any reasoning about their opponent’s behavior. If this distinguishes the Prisoners’
5See Williamson (1993) for an outright rejection of trust as a concept with a meaning of its own in
economics.
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Dilemma from the trust game, where agents decide on whether to trust or to withhold
trust after making up their mind as for their opponent’s trustworthiness, the implica-
tions for collective action problems are the same: Much like in the trust game, where
the inferior outcome is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, players in a Prisoners’
Dilemma are faced with zero room for efficiency. This is essentially because they cannot
credibly commit themselves to cooperative play in a world where binding contracts are
not provided for. For such a commitment to be meaningful, it must be in the individuals’
own interest to act on their promise. Both players of course prefer the outcome of mutual
cooperation to a state of mutual defection. Mutual cooperation is however ruled out
by the dominant-strategy nature of the PD, where the safe option to unilaterally defect
and exploit one’s opponent excludes the efficient outcome of mutual cooperation from
the feasible set. Accordingly, efforts to rationalize cooperation in the one-shot PD in the
following vein are hopeless6: Symmetrically rational players in a symmetric game should
expect themselves to make identical choices and should therefor cooperate as they prefer
mutual cooperation over mutual defection. The fact that both players would in fact prefer
the unattainable outcome of mutual cooperation over what they end up with raises the
problem rather than contributing to its solution.
2.3 Iteration
The standard approach in game theory to allow for cooperation in PD-like problems—
taken in the ’folk theorems’ and rigorously formalized by Aumann (1959) — is to argue
that the immediate gains from exploiting a cooperative move come at a cost, namely
punishment in subsequent encounters. In the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (IPD), the
stage game is periodically played by the same individuals over and over again, constituting
a ’supergame’ in which players can condition their actions on their opponent’s behavior
in previous interactions. A pure strategy in a supergame specifies which action to take
6See Binmore (1994, ch. 3.3 and 3.4), who likens such attempts to efforts of “squaring the circle”.
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in each of the periods for all of the histories of play that may have materialized in the
periods before, and players choose among the different strategies in order to maximize
e. g. the present value of the flow of (usually discounted) von-Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities they attach to the stage game outcomes.
2.3.1 Cooperative Equilibrium
The number of strategies conceivable in the IPD is of course immense. In order to see
how iteration can foster cooperative outcomes it is convenient to highlight a specific
trigger strategy which means to basically cooperate but equally to switch to continual
defection against an opponent who has exploited one’s cooperativeness. Depending on
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility differences and the possible discounting of future as
opposed to present utilities, a player may find it in her interest to refrain from defecting
even if utilities are strictly monotonic in the stage-game earnings: Defecting against a
cooperator-retaliator would confer a one-time advantage as in the one-shot case, but
this must be traded against a lost stream of future gains from successful cooperation
over mutual defection when no definite end of the sequence of play is in sight. If future
utilities are not discounted too much over immediate ones, the cost of defecting may well
outweigh the benefit.
Two players who face each other in an IPD and expect each other to do this kind of
reasoning will both opt for the trigger strategy considered and attain a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of self-serving mutual cooperation. This equilibrium is sustained by
vigilance, i. e. the credible threat on the part of either side to protect themselves and
retaliate against an act of exploitation by taking the measure which best serves their
interest in such an event, namely to defect from then on. Two caveats, however, are
in order: Cooperation can only obtain in the purely theoretical case of an infinite time
horizon: If the sequence of play were known to end after some number of interactions
with certainty, individuals would prefer to defect in the last stage as they need not fear
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future punishment from then on. If defection cannot be averted in the last stage, there is
however no convincing point in investing in the relationship by cooperating in the second-
to-last interaction. In the case of strictly rational players, cooperation unravels across the
board as such reasoning applies to all encounters by way of backward induction, even if
the end of the play sequence is moved further and further into the future.7 If an infinite
time horizon is thus necessary for ’rational cooperation’ to obtain in the IPD, it is however
not sufficient: The best response to an opponent expected to go through with a strategy
of continual defection is again to invariably defect just like her and avoid the painful (and
costly) lesson of being exploited on the first encounter. A problem of coordination arises.
2.3.2 Coordination Problems
Introducing the trigger strategy makes the inefficient state of mutual defection less com-
pelling compared to the one-shot PD case. It does not, however, solve the commitment
problem: Cooperation can be reconciled with individual rationality when agents play
the Prisoners’ Dilemma repeatedly in the context of never-ending idiosyncratic relations,
but only if both expects their opponent to embark on the trigger strategy as well. What
expectations to form is however a highly non-trivial question: Continual mutual defection
is just as consistent with Nash equilibrium as the successful cooperation. To achieve
mutual cooperation requires agents to coordinate themselves on a specific equilibrium.
In fact, as pointed out by Brian Skyrms (2004, p. 5), the present value matrix of the
utility flows for two agents choosing among the cooperative-retaliatory and the defective
strategy can take the form of a paradigmatic coordination game, the Stag Hunt. The
Stag Hunt formalizes a story originally told by Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the material
rewards and risks of investing oneself in a cooperative venture: Mutual investments entail
7See Radner (1980) for the case of “ε-rational” players who do not insist on theirmost preferred outcome
but content themselves with a result that comes (arbitrarily) close to their optimum. These players can
achieve mutual cooperation with finitely repeated play.
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the highest possible earnings for each of the two individuals, but unilateral investments
are in vain, as costs are incurred without the corresponding benefits.
Figure 2.3 shows the present values of the utility8 flows for two players in an IPD who
discount the future with rate δ> 0. The discount applied to future utilities may reflect
players’ rate of time preference or the fact that the sequence of play may end after each
period with constant probability δ. In symmetric interactions by two individuals who
both employ the trigger (defective) strategy, mutual cooperation (defection) will ensue
over the entire sequence of play and the present values are simply Rδ (
P
δ ). An outcome
where both players employ the trigger strategy and thus achieve mutual cooperation is
unanimously preferred over the defective outcome just like in the one-shot case. The good
news here is that mutual cooperation qualifies as an equilibrium outcome: Approaching
a trigger strategy by acting the same can be preferable to trying to exploit the trigger
strategy by defecting from the beginning on, which would result in a present value of
T −P + Pδ = T + 1−δδ P . This is the case if and only if 0 < δ < R−PT−P , i. e. if players do not
discount the future to an extent whichwouldmake the initial exploitation gainT−R weigh
more than the punishment to be suffered from the second interaction on, 1−δ
δ
(R−P ). Not
surprisingly but equally important, the trigger strategy played against a defector results
in S + 1−δ
δ
P , which represents a loss of P − S > 0 compared to the case of matching a
defector’s behavior from the start and averting an act of exploitation in the first stage.
trigger continual defection
trigger R
δ
S+ 1−δ
δ
P
continual defection T + 1−δ
δ
P P
δ
Figure 2.3: Present Value Matrix of Payoff Flows in an Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
8The symbols used are the same as in section 2.2 in order to facilitate comparison with the one-shot
case, although they denote utilities instead of earnings. A linear utility function with zero intercept and
unity slope lends itself in this context.
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Provided that δ< R−PT−P , this IPD takes the structure of a Stag Hunt: It pays to “invest” in
the relationship if the opponent acts the same while unilateral investments are in vain.
Each player’s utility-maximizing decision will thus depend on her expectations about
her opponent’s behavior, which will be confirmed in either of the two pure equilibria:
Both will either embark on the trigger strategy and consequently cooperate in all stages
or pursue a strategy of defection from the beginning on. Considering that these equilibria
(along with a mixed one where players embark on the trigger and the defective strategy
with strictly positive probability) are not the only possible outcomes in more general
versions of the IPD, the coordination problem is even compounded: Deferring an analysis
of the many other possible history-dependent strategies but generalizing the trigger
strategy to implicit agreements by both players to randomize jointly over cooperating
and defecting, the set of feasible (per-period) earnings vectors expands to the convex
hull of the stage game earnings. As is known from the Folk Theorem, Nash equilibrium
for sufficiently low discount rates is consistent with all feasible earnings vectors which
are not inferior to the stage game equilibrium of mutual defection, i. e. the whole of the
shaded area in figure 2.4.
 
T 
T P 
P 
R S 
S 
R 
Figure 2.4: Set of Feasible and Individually Rational Per-Period Earnings in the IPD
In other words, virtually any ’amount’ of cooperation over time (including zero) is possible
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in the IPD, raising again the question of which outcome (if any) can be predicted to obtain.
Summing up, a problem of equilibrium selection is faced, the crucial point being players’
expectations about their opponents’ behavior. Classical game theory has little to say
about how players form expectations when faced with multiple equilibria which survive
the uncontroversial refinement of subgame perfection— as is the case not only in figure
2.3 but also in the general IPD9 —and thus remains largely silent in this context.
2.3.3 The Axelrod Tournaments and Evolutionary Game Theory
The IPD tournaments organized by Robert Axelrod (1984) speak to the equilibrium selec-
tion problem in the IPD and to the wide variety of possible strategies, which goes well
beyond the trigger strategies considered this far. Axelrod invited scientists to submit IPD
strategies, formalized as finite automata coded in computer programs, and had them
play one another a number of symmetric PD interactions in round-robin tournaments.10
Strategies were at the end of a tournament ranked on the basis of total cumulative payoffs
in all encounters. In the first tournament (repeated five times), each strategy played
all others for 200 interactions. Although only continual defection was defensible on
grounds of commonly known rationality, 14 different strategies were submitted. Top-
scoring among these was Tit-For-Tat (TFT), submitted by Anatol Rapaport, which means
to cooperate initially and, in the word of Robert Trivers (1971), “reciprocate” whatever an
opponent did on the previous move from then on. Axelrod modified the design for the
second tournament to rule out possible endgame effects and to align the experiment with
the theoretically interesting case of infinite or uncertain length. In the five rounds of the
second tournament, play duration was drawn from a random distribution which implied
a median length of again 200 interactions. TFT emerged victorious from the second tour-
9See Friedman (1971).
10Each strategy was also confronted with a copy of itself and a randomizing strategy.
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nament just as it had won the first. To check whether TFT’s success depended in fact on
the specificmix of strategies submitted to the tournaments, Axelrod subsequently took an
“ecological” approach in a third experiment. In the ecological simulation, the composition
of the strategy pool was updated after each round to reflect strategies in proportion to
their relative success: Strategies with above-average payoffs would be represented to a
higher degree then before, while below-average scoring strategies would get crowded out
of the pool. As it turned out, TFT caught on in the ecological tournament as well — at least
in the sense that it was represented in the long-run strategy pool to a higher proportion
than any other strategy.11
Axelrod attributed TFT’s success to it being “nice” (never the first to defect), retaliatory,
forgiving and easy to understand at the same time and highlighted the importance of
these characteristics for the resolution of collective action problems. Despite its intuitive
appeal and impressive performance in the computer tournaments, TFT as a strategy in
the infinite-horizon IPD appears in a different light when deductively analyzed in terms
of the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) concept. The notion of an ESS was originally
introduced by evolutionary biologists JohnMaynard Smith and George R. Price12, who
were the first to apply the theory of games to the study of animal behavior and conflict.
Maynard Smith and Price observed that the resource value conferred upon an animal
by a specific behavior, much like the earnings for a strategy in a game, depends on the
behaviors pursued by the rest of the population. Evolutionary game theory was born
when they proposed to formalize the competition for resources governing survival and
reproduction as an uncooperative game. An evolutionary game is played in a large
population with random pairings over and over again. Selection according to relative
success as well as random influences —mutation— determine how the mix of strategies
pursued in a population changes from generation to generation.13 Maynard Smith and
11See Binmore (1994, ch. 3.2.5) for an adjustment of the widespread belief that TFT ’won’ the ecological
tournament.
12See Maynard Smith & Price (1973).
13Axelrod used the term “ecological” instead of “evolutionary” for his simulations in the third tourna-
ment. In fact, mutations were not accounted for in his analysis.
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Price defined an ESS as a behavior which — when pursued by the vast majority in a
population—will resist the competition from an alternative strategy (or a combination
of strategies) injected into the system in small doses. In other words, a population settled
in an ESS equilibrium fends off an attempted invasion by ’mutants’.
While the ESS concept allows to select amongmultiple Nash equilibria in many games,
in the IPD it cannot lend support to an all-TFT equilibrium which Axelrod’s ecological
tournament might inspire: Follow Bendor & Swistak (1997) in considering e.g. the event
of a slightly less provokable strategy of ”Tit-For-Two-Tats” (TF2T) being injected into an
all-TFT pool. TF2T, which tolerates a single defection and retaliates only when defected
against twice, will easily find anddefend its place in the population: In confrontationswith
TFT, provocability is uncalled for and hence no asset, and TF2T therefore does just as well
as the incumbents. TFT is therefore evolutionary stable at best in a ’weak’ sense: It may
be argued that such an invasion is neutral because neither will TFT’s frequency further
decrease nor has observed play changed. Yet TFT and hence cooperation in general
are prone to disaster in the updated strategy pool via a cascade of further invasions by
strategies with decreasing ’niceness’, at least when earnings monotonicity is the only
restriction placed on the evolutionary process.14 This allows Bendor and Swistak to
conclude that TFT is in general not even “weakly” stable. Apart from the fact that TFT
and hence reciprocity were from this point of view oversold in the wake of Axelrod’s
tournaments, thinking in ESS terms turns out as a source of frustration with regard to the
problem of equilibrium selection in the IPD in general: As is formally shown by Farrell &
Ware (1989) andMarinoff (1990), no pure strategy (in fact, not even a finitemixture of pure
strategies) can be considered an ESS in the IPD15. In this sense, TFT’s success was due
14Bendor and Swistak’s example is the arrival of a strategy called “Suspicious Tit-For-Tat” (meaning
to defect on the first encounter and return to TFT only if one was not defected against) which poses
no problem for TF2T but will lock-in with TFT in an indefinite sequence of mutual defection. TF2T
consequently emerges at the top of the earnings hierarchy. Under e. g. an “imitate-the-winner” dynamic
where only the highest earning strategies develop, the population will then tend to an all-TF2T pool, which
in turn invites a takeover by (first) a strategy which alternates between defection and cooperation and (then)
continual defection.
15See however Lorberbaum et al. (2002) who show that three ESS in one-move-memory strategies exist
in an IPD where players are sufficiently “error-prone“ in strategy implementation, i. e. respond to their
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to Rapaport’s accurately “forecasting” the high number of cooperative strategies among
the submissions by other participants (see Field 2001, ch. 3). Essentially not much is
done about the problem of equilibrium selection by invoking the evolutionary approach,
except that the initial distribution of strategies in the population takes the place of players’
beliefs about their opponents’ behavior.
2.3.4 Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma in Evolving Artificial ’Societies’
If the evolutionary approach to the IPD has not proved as helpful in increasing predic-
tive power as onemight have hoped, Axelrod’s work laid the foundations for a strand of
research which adds the dimension of interaction structure to the analysis. In the tour-
naments, each strategy was paired with all opponents in a round-robin fashion and the
resulting relationships were ’closed’ in that all of them persisted for a common (expected)
number of interactions. The only way to punish a defective move was hence to treat
like with like. Recent ’agent-based’ studies, in contrast, have boundedly rational agents
interact within in artificial ’societies’, the structure of which is taken to evolve conjointly
with agents’ behavior in the IPD16. Strategies in these simulations are hence not limited
to rules of behavior to apply in any given IPD relationship. ’Agents’ rather decide for
themselves with whom to play or at least have the option to end relationships as they
please, which gives cooperative behavior an additional margin of defense against being
cheated.
The exit option of ending the sequence of play is precisely what favors cooperation in
Schüßler (1989). All agents in Schüßler’s model — unconditional cooperators as well
as a variety of ’trigger’ strategies which defect after having displayed a specific number
opponent’s previous action by making the ’wrong’ move with a certain probability. Ironically, these do not
include the “²” analogue of TFT but certainly that of continual defection.
16See Tesfatsion (forthcoming) for a survey of the expanding field of “agent-based computational
economics”.
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of cooperative moves — transit an anonymous “search pool” to find partners for the
IPD. While agents in the search pool have no information about potential opponents
whatsoever, the IPD is played in an “iteration pool” within ex-ante stable relationships
to be exogenously broken only with a small probability. In contrast to the ’canonical’
IPD, however, play sequences in Schüßler’s model end for an endogenous reason as
well: Agents can dismiss their opponent if they no longer wish to continue the match.
Such endogenous exit lends itself to unconditional cooperators as an act of retaliation
against being cheated and is equally taken by defectors when cheated upon during their
initial phase of cooperativeness. Following a relationship break-up, the parties involved
(both the aggressor and the victim in the endogenous case) are sent back to the search
pool. While it is true that anonymity in the search pool enables defective strategies to
exploitative acts of the ’hit-and-run’ type, ex-ante stability of matches in the interaction
pool clearly favors cooperation: Unlike defectors, cooperators are given the chance to
form relationships which remain intact and yield the fruit from mutual cooperation
for the involved until exogenously cut. Uncooperative strategies therefore have to look
for new partners and transit the search pool more often than cooperators and tend to
be confined to the earnings from mutual defection as they “have to face new partners
who might be as mean or meaner than they are themselves” (p. 737). The upshot of
Schüßler’s simulations is clear: Endogenous exit is sufficient for otherwise unconditional
cooperators to collect higher earnings than defectors and catch on in the populationwhen
the exogenous break-up probability is small and evolution proceeds slowly, i. e. when the
long-term benefits accruing to cooperators in stable relationships overcompensate the
’hit-and-run’ exploitation gains from defection.
While agents in an anonymous search pool have no choice concerningwithwhom to enter
into a play sequence, cooperators in Schüßler’s IPD can selectively stay with their like.
The resulting population structure gives cooperators an important edge over defectors. A
natural way to explore the role of population structure in the IPD further is to have agents
decide not only on how long to stay with a given partner but also on whom to play in
the first place. This is achieved in a series of models with “choice and refusal” (CR) à la
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Gale & Shapley (1962), where agents can identify and remember potential opponents
and make use of agent-related information not only in existing relationships but equally
in their initiation. The logic shared by these models is that play sequences are started,
continued or resumed only when an offer is made by an agent to play a specific partner
and accepted by the addressee. In other words, each IPD stage including the first requires
both parties to establish or renewmutual consent to the transaction.
In Ashlock et al. (1996) agents base their choice and refusal decisions on expected payoffs
which are the symmetric at the beginning of a simulation but are updated after each
iteration stage: Whenever two agents agree to play one another, the earnings received
from the interaction enter into an agents’ books which keep a weighted average of past
and present earnings achieved by playing that particular opponent. Offers are made
and accepted only if the expected earnings against the potential opponent exceed a
“minimum tolerance level”. More precisely, each agent ranks potential opponents on the
basis of expected earnings and extends one offer towards the most promising agent if the
associated expected earnings are tolerable. Conversely, all offers received from tolerable
agents are accepted. Agents who find all potential opponents intolerable and neither
extend nor accept any offers earn a “wallflower” amount, while a “refusal” amount is
earned by agents whose offer is rejected by an uninterested addressee. The dynamics of
the society in this model is governed by average cumulated earnings — normalized by
the total number of earnings achieved either by engaging in IPD stages and/or receiving
wallflower or refusal earnings—and formalized as a genetic algorithm inspired byHolland
(1975): As in Axelrod’s tournaments, IPD behaviors are represented as finite automata and
formalized as bit strings which code for an initial move as well as the moves to make in
response to an opponent’s previous behavior. In synchronized “genetic steps” at the end
of a generation, couples are formed among a specified number of agents selected from the
top of the earnings hierarchy, resulting in offspring with genetic material recombined and
mutated from their “parents”’ bit strings. Behaviors with above-average success thus tend
to spread in the population as the genetically evolved offspring replace agents ranking at
the bottom of the earnings scale. Ashlock et al. report their simulation results in terms of
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the overall average earnings observed and find that cooperative behavior is favored in
comparison with the ’unstructured’ case of round-robin or randommatching. Besides
allowing for the emergence of interesting social networks, preferential partner selection
due to a suitably chosen minimum tolerance level (given the other parameters) enables
cooperation to spread in the population rather quickly in a many simulation runs. On
the other hand — in particular for high refusal or wallflower earnings — populations
may degenerate into “wallflower ecologies” of autistic agents where inactivity becomes a
general phenomenon.
A closely related model by Hauk (2001) further increases the viability of cooperation and
addresses the problem of wallflower ecologies by endogenizing the minimum tolerance
level. Inmost of their simulations, Ashlock et al. treated the tolerance level as a commonly
shared parameter. Some runs, however, had it evolve as part of agents’ genetic makeup
and surprisingly resulted in lower average earnings compared to parameterized cases
where the tolerance level was chosen to equal the wallflower earnings. Hauk takes a
different approach and has agents continually adjust their tolerance levels as part of an
individual learning process which also encompasses periodical revision of IPD behaviors
and thus takes the place of population learning in Ashlock et al. Also in contrast to Ashlock
et al., only five IPD automata of reduced behavioral complexity are considered: Uncon-
ditional cooperation, TFT and TF2T (which are all ’nice’) as well as ’Rip’ and continual
defection who are not. (Rip was originally conceived as a strategy to take advantage of
TF2T’s forbearance by defecting every other time in the ’paradigmatic’ IPD.) Agents in
Hauk’s model keep track of a moving average of earnings achieved against all previously
played opponents and use this average as theirminimum tolerance level. The endogeneity
of the tolerance level allows cooperators to free themselves out of “parasitic” relationships
with a defecting agent, which are observed in Ashlock et al. for tolerance levels chosen
too low given the remaining parameters. Instead their minimum tolerance level rises
over time to reflect the potential experienced in encounters with other (nicer) opponents,
and the parasite is eventually unmasked and rejected as a partner. Although not playing
an iteration results in zero earnings and hence unambiguously in an opportunity cost
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as all earnings in the IPD stages are nonnegative, the cost associated with refusing an
intolerable offer is affordable for cooperative agents: After all, they quickly come to form
a subpopulation of their own and interact exclusively with each other, achieving the
benefits from mutual cooperation over mutual defection. Defecting strategies in turn
“learn” to be contentwith interacting among themselves rather than becomingwallflowers
and are eventually induced to switch to ’nicer’ behavior at the next strategy revision step,
which is when they are informed about the high earnings harvested by the cooperative
agents. The result indicated by Hauk’s simulations is stable cooperative play among the
nice strategies with occasional and unsuccessful invasions by Rip mutants.
In the choice-and-refusal models agents endorse a specific (possibly complex in Ashlock
et al.) IPD strategy and in each iteration decide with whom (if at all) to play based on
previous experiences of their own with the available opponents. The resulting population
structure clearly favors agents with cooperative IPD strategies including (but not limited
to) TFT and thus supports the workings of reciprocity. Reciprocity as modeled by TFT
is direct in nature and perhaps best summarized in the saying, “I won’t scratch your
back if you don’t scratch mine.” The model by Nowak & Sigmund (1998) differs in this
regard as agents can adopt an attitude of “I won’t scratch your back if you don’t scratch
theirs” and hence act as indirect reciprocators (see Alexander 1987). Interactions in this
model are evocative of the Trust Game described in section 2.1 not only because they
take an asymmetric form: In each encounter, a potential donor is given the option to
extend a helping hand to her opponent, where the cost of helping is smaller than the
benefit conferred upon the recipient. (If no help is given, both parties’ earnings are
zero.) Providing helping is thus collectively desirable. Yet given that recipients are like a
vegetable in this game, without any capacity to reward helpful donors, rational players
in the donor position have no incentive to help much like first-movers in the trust game
choose not to trust as they anticipate rational second-movers’ untrustworthiness. In
Nowak and Sigmund’s model, the donor-recipient game is played in a population with
random pairing, and the roles of potential donor and recipient within an encounter are
assigned randomly. Agents do not condition their behavior on individual play histories
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with specific partners (in fact, the chance to meet one and the same agent more than
once is negligibly small in the model). All agents are however assigned an individual
and fraud-resistant “image score” which allows to address the phenomenon of indirect
reciprocity. At the beginning of a generation the image score is zero for all agents. In
the course of a generation (where any given agent plays the donor-recipient game once,
several times or not at all; agents who are not selected to play receive zero earnings),
an agent’s image score summarizes how she performs as a donor within the general
population in the following way: Whenever an agent is chosen as a potential donor and
provides (refuses to) help, her image score increases (decreases) by one. Image scores
of potential or actual recipients are unchanged. Potential donors can condition their
action— if not on their own previous experience with a particular opponent — on their
opponent’s image in society by looking at her score. An agent’s strategy hence amounts to
a number which specifies the minimum score a potential recipient has to have for the
agent to provide help when chosen as a potential donor. At the end of each generation, all
agents have offspring according to their cumulated earnings. In the absence of mutations,
offspring inherit the strategy of their parents, yet their image score starts off at zero. In
their simulations of the basic case where each agent’s image score is visible for all agents
and mutations are excluded, Nowak and Sigmund find that indirect reciprocity is indeed
established in the population as the following strategy eventually takes over: Help others
if and only if they have an image score of zero or more. In the presence of mutations,
endless cycles of cooperation and defection are observed: Unconditional cooperators
who appear due to random influences can invade a cooperative population of indirect
reciprocators, and the society gets vulnerable to defectors who never provide help. With a
large proportion of defectors in the population, indirect reciprocators’ vigilance against
getting exploited comes back into play again and facilitates a resurgence of cooperative
behavior.
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2.4 Empirical Salience and Theoretical Alternatives
The models reviewed in the previous section make an important point by indicating
that structured interactions favor the evolution of cooperation in the IPD. Predictive
power is increased in comparison to the ’canonical’ evolutionary IPD with round-robin
or randommatching in that cooperative equilibria gain independence from the initial
composition of the strategy pool. In these models, they rather obtain— given the right
circumstances — within “evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents”17. If taking
interaction structure into account can help us understand the evolution of cooperation
in repeated games, the assumptions involved in the IPD approach as such remain a
source of dissatisfaction. Is the ’shadow of the future’ an appropriate representation of
modern large-scale societies? In today’s market economies, business transactions take
place in an increasingly anonymous setting. Business gets increasingly depersonalized as
transportation costs and other barriers to trade become less and less important. With an
increasing pace of social and technological progress, business partners change frequently
and relationships get more and more ephemeral. For the repeated-game argument to
go through, however, players must be in longer-term idiosyncratic relationships which
allow them to keep a log of their opponents’ observed behavior in (at least a few of) past
encounters.
Authors of agent-based IPDmodels are of course aware of these informational require-
ments: Adding to the basic case where each agent’s image score is visible for all others,
Nowak & Sigmund (1998) conducted simulation studies with incomplete information
about image scores. Agents in these runs can update their image of a potential donor
in an encounter between two individuals only if they happened to observe the trans-
action, which is the case with probability smaller than one. Nowak and Sigmund find
that incomplete information concerning image scores does not impede the evolution of
indirect reciprocity but makes the model sensitive to the number of interactions taking
17Tesfatsion (forthcoming)
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place within a generation and to population size: Indirect reciprocators depend on a
large number of interactions taking place in a small population to counteract the reduced
accuracy of image scores. In a related vein, Hruschka & Henrich (2006) study a model of
preferential partner choice among unconditional defectors along with “cliquers”, whose
memory covers a small subgroup of preferred partners rather than the entire population.
Cliquers in their model try to pair and cooperate— unless theymake amistake and defect
—with members of their clique, whose attractiveness as a partner they summarize in an
individual-related index similar to the expected earnings in Ashlock et al. When none of
their preferred partners is available, cliquers give as yet unknown opponents a chance
by cooperating with a probability reflecting their degree of niceness towards strangers.
Depending on their performance as IPD partners, members of a clique can get deleted
from the cliquer’s list and replaced by a new partner. Simulations of the model suggest
that personalized interactions with a limited set of partners are sufficient to sustain the
evolution of cooperation in cliques, i. e. niceness and forbearance towards preferred
partners and skepticism towards strangers.
These are only two examples of how the informational requirements in evolutionary
models of the IPD have been relaxed. Nevertheless, a repeated-game argument will by
definition always remain at the core of the IPD approach to the evolution of cooperation.
Yet it is precisely the non-iterated case in which the importance of trust is greatest and
at the same time the problem of trust most pronounced: Modernmarket economies—
dispensing to an important extent with idiosyncratic relations — provide ample room
for easily anticipated opportunism which one would expect to require costly ex-ante
safeguards or block mutually beneficial transactions altogether. Yet casual observation of
everyday transactions (which are so self-evident that they go largely unnoticed) speaks
a clear language in favor of people’s willingness and capacity to cooperate: Travelers
often leave significant tips aftermeals in motel restaurants which they know to never visit
again, participants in experiments give a fraction of the cake to responders inDictator
Games even when stakes are high, and anonymous donations to charity are surprisingly
common. No repeated-game effects can be at work in these cases as future interactions
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between the parties involved can safely be ruled out. Yet (many) people allow business
and social life to operate smoothly by refraining from the safe and profitable option of
refusing to tip, share or donate. These people are prepared to give part of their ownwealth
or, equivalently, neglect opportunities in sporadic interactions where a free ride at others’
efforts and expense would go unpunished with certainty. This amounts to cooperating in
a one-shot PD situation, where rationality in the standard game-theoretic sense would
leave players with no other choice than to defect.
2.5 Summary and Discussion
Game theory portrays the chances for cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma situations in
a sobering light. This comes of course as no surprise, as the PD is constructed precisely
with the impossibility of cooperation in mind. A dilemma is posed for society more
than for the players, who have a dominant strategy at hand. Things are different yet still
problematic in the iterated case. An infinite play sequence between any given two players
and successful coordination is required for sustained mutual cooperation to obtain as
one of many Nash equilibria. The explanatory power of game theory in this context can
be enhanced by the evolutionary approach, especially when the level of abstraction of
standard game-theoretic models is reduced like in agent-based models with e. g. choice
and refusal of partners. If the evolutionary approach can also remedy the backward
induction problem— as long as no strategies are admitted which know the end of a given
relationship in advance and defect in the final stage, provoking strategies that defect on
the second-to-last stage, and so on— its applicability still depends crucially on repeated-
game effects. How can the evolutionary approach be applied to the one-shot case, which
is so important in today’s mass societies?
Themodel by Orbell & Dawes (1991) provides an illustration of how evolutionary thinking
accommodates structured interactions in an analysis of sporadic interactions in anony-
mous settings. Players in this model cannot recognize former acquaintances, let alone
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condition their actions on opponents’ previous behavior. Whenever they engage in a
(one-shot) PD interaction, their pure strategy is hence either unconditional coopera-
tion or unconditional defection. Interaction structure arises in the model from players’
decision whether to play at all: Orbell and Dawes consider a specific earnings matrix,
where the earnings from playing a defector are strictly negative and the earnings from
playing a cooperator strictly positive. For both cooperative and defective strategies it is
hence worthwhile to voluntarily engage in an interaction if and only if they expect to
be faced with a cooperative move. Orbell and Dawes model their agents as “cognitive
misers”: When forming expectations about any potential opponent, they tend to use a
heuristic of projecting their own intentions onto others. Cooperators’ subjectively per-
ceived probability of meeting a cooperator is thus higher than defectors’. Cooperators as
a consequence offer and accept to play a PDmore often than defectors, which provides
them with a competitive advantage over defectors as they tend to harvest the fruit from
mutual cooperation, while defectors tend to content themselves with the (zero-valued)
outside option of not playing.
Repeated-game effects are hence not essential to the evolution of cooperation, at least
when other ’suitable’ circumstances are met — in Orbell and Dawes, agents’ heuristic
when forming expectations and an outside option which yields higher earnings than
playing a defective move. The crucial factor is interaction structure, which can obtain
with the most sporadic of interactions in a priori anonymous settings — including the
animal kingdom. The next chapter is therefore concerned with evolutionary biology.
Chapter 3
Evolutionary Biology, Group Selection,
and Altruism
Following the strictly dominated strategy of cooperating in the one-shot PDmeans not
only to content oneself with lower earnings than would result from defecting, but equally
to advance the resources of one’s opponent. Such behavior is referred to as a genuinely
altruistic act by biologists, who have been studying altruism for a much longer time than
evolutionary game theorists. Building on Charles Darwin’s paradigm of the “survival of the
fittest”, evolutionary biology is concerned with the differential survival and reproduction
of different gene sets which encode possibly different behaviors. Resulting differences
in fitness for their bearers determine the dynamics of genotypes when natural selection
operates on the population as the game is played over and over again, in the sense that
individuals with below-average fitness give way to the more fit over time.
In evolutionary analyses it comes as no surprise that results depend crucially on the
selection criterion applied. In the paradigmatic case, where selection pressures are taken
to aim at individual fitness in unstructured populations, the hopelessness in explaining
cooperation by rational players in the one-shot PD carries over directly to an evolutionary
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account of altruism. When advantages in individual fitness foster survival and repro-
duction and altruists incur fitness penalties for the benefit of some selfish competition,
they are bound to continually lose ground in the population and asymptotically become
extinct. At the end of the day, purely individual selection just like individual rationality
rules out altruistic behavior by its very definition: Individuals supposed to evolve when
selected along the lines of individual fitness simply cannot afford altruistic resource
transfers to competitors which leave themwith below-average fitness. On the contrary,
competition will eventually ensure that all ’survivors’ in evolution turn out to behave in a
way which best serves their turn in terms of individual resources. In fact, such reasoning
is a methodological cornerstone in some parts of economics:18 The differential expansion
of firms on the basis of profits is precisely the grounds on which standard economics
views— if not the process, then the results of — entrepreneurs’ decision-making “as if”
profit maximization was their goal. A related idea in game theory is that behaviors which
result in high earnings get preferentially learned and adopted by a large number of players
who try out different strategies and evaluate them according to their performance. John
Nash in his doctoral thesis invoked the “mass action” interpretation to lend additional
support to his solution concept: Equilibrium outcomes appear and can be conceived of
as if each player went for maximum individual utility — typically monotone in individual
earnings — given the actions of others. Yet if the workings of selection pressures offer
themselves to support economists’ maximizing hypothesis, an evolutionary framework
offers alternatives to purely individual selection.
Concerning different targets of selection, Charles Darwin had higher-level selection
mechanisms in mind right from the start. In The Descent of Man, he expands on the
competition among “tribes” conquering each other according to relative success. Altruists
are penalized in terms of individual fitness relative to nonaltruists within each tribe. One
level above, however, altruists when largely among themselves, i. e. in tribes with a
disproportionately high number of altruists, benefit from the fitness margin conferred
18See Friedman (1953, p. 21) but also Alchian (1950).
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upon these tribes vis-à-vis low-altruism tribes.19 After all, tribes with a relatively high
number of altruists can be expected to operate at higher levels of productivity and grow
at the expense of largely ’selfish’ tribes.
3.1 Simpson’s Paradox, and the Evolution of Cooperation
andWithin-Group Altruism
Darwin’s appreciation of the group-adaptive qualities of altruism makes an important
point with regard to the analysis of collective action problems in modern large-scale soci-
eties: Altruistic cooperation as exemplified in a game of (repeated) one-shot Prisoners’
Dilemma is not necessarily ruled out by the criterion of selection among individuals who
compete on the basis of individual wealth. At the heart of this claim is a phenomenon
known in statistics as Simpson’s Paradox (Simpson 1951). An oft-cited example of this
phenomenon was encountered by the University of California in Berkeley in their admis-
sion process20: ’Although’ women applicants were enjoying higher success rates than
male applicants in almost every department, fewer women than men turned out to be
accepted at the university as a whole. What explained this result was by no means the few
departments where men were slightly more successful, but rather the fact that women
tended to apply for programs which are harder to get into in general (irrespective of sex)
than the programs envisioned by male applicants. This section provides an illustration of
this idea in the context of cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Consider a large number of individuals who engage in sporadic PD interactions and are
genetically or socially predisposed to either cooperate or defect. By construction of the
PD, a cooperator will receive lower earnings compared to a defector at her place in any
19See Darwin (1874, p. 134f).
20See Bickel et al. (1975).
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given situation, regardless of the opponent’s type. This is precisely why cooperating in a
sporadic PD game amounts to irrationally pursuing a dominated strategy and remains
enigmatic through the lens of classical game theory. Yet the PD has another property
with potentially important implications in an evolutionary setting: The expected levels
of earnings increase in either type’s chances of playing a cooperator. This is true for
defectors, as their hopes of taking a free ride on others’ efforts increase, and is equally
true for cooperators, as their risk of getting exploited is lowered:
EC = pCCR+
(
1−pCC
)
S = pCC (R−S)+S and (3.1)
ED = pCDT +
(
1−pCD
)
P = pCD (T −P )+P, (3.2)
where pCC ∈ [0,1] and pCD ∈ [0,1] denote cooperators’ and defectors’ odds of playing
a cooperator, respectively. In the standard evolutionary setting of a large unstructured
population with randommatching among NC cooperators and ND defectors, the odds
of playing a cooperator correspond to the proportion of cooperators in the population
and are the same for both types, pCC = pCD = pC := NCNC+ND ∈ [0,1]. While inspection
of (3.1) and (3.2) confirms that dECdpC ,
dED
dpC
> 0, the level effect cannot be invoked in favor
of cooperators: EC < ED∀pC . An oversimplified yet instructive way to see how the PD
nevertheless allows for precisely the type of group effect invoked byDarwin is by assuming
a population partitioned into two groups. Let NC1 and ND1 denote the numbers of
cooperators and defectors in the first group andNC2 andND2 the corresponding numbers
in the second group. Assume that the proportion of cooperators in group one, pC1 :=
NC1
NC1+ND1 ∈ (0,1) is higher than in the second: pC2 :=
NC2
NC2+ND2 < pC1 and restrict pairings
to occur within each of two groups. Earnings for both cooperators and defectors will
accordingly be higher in the first group compared to earnings for the same type in in
the second: EC1 = pC1 (R−S)+ S > pC2 (R−S)+ S = EC2 and ED1 = pC1 (T −P )+P >
pC2 (T −P )+P = ED2 as pC1 > pC2. A structure like this allows for cooperators in the
first group to have higher expected earnings than defectors in the second, reflecting the
dominance of mutual cooperation over mutual defection which is just as essential to the
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PD as the temptation to unilaterally defect:
EC1 = pC1 (R−S)+S > pC2 (T −P )+P = ED2
⇔ pC1 >
(
T −P
R−S
)
pC2+ P −S
R−S
can clearly occur for pC1,pC2 ∈ (0,1) as P−SR−S < 1 by construction of the PD. While cooper-
ators are still penalized in terms of resources and act altruistically21 vis-à-vis defectors
within each of the groups:
EC1 = pC1 (R−S)+S < pC1 (T −P )+P = ED1 and
EC2 = pC2 (R−S)+S < pC2 (T −P )+P = ED2,
cooperators can in fact end up with a higher earnings than defectors when computing
the receipts EˆC and EˆD of (fictitious) representative agent types across groups:
EˆC =φEC1+
(
1−φ)EC2 >ψED1+ (1−ψ)ED2 = EˆD
where φ := NC1NC1+NC2 ∈ (0,1) and ψ :=
ND1
ND1+ND2 ∈ (0,1) are the proportions of cooperators
and defectors belonging to the first group instead of the second, respectively. To see
this more clearly, assume a special case22 where groups are of equal size, NC1+ND1 =
NC2+ND2, and where the population is equally divided into cooperators and defectors,
NC1+NC2 =ND1+ND2. Thenφ= 1−ϕ= pC1 and 1−φ=ϕ= pC2 along with pC1+pC2 = 1.
“Representative type” earnings read EˆC = pC1EC1+pC2EC2 and EˆD = pC2ED1+pC1ED2, so
that EˆC > EˆD becomes
(
p2C1+p2C2
)
(R−S)+S > 2pC1pC2 (T −P )+P.
21If groups were continua of sufficiently small size, the within-group altruistic nature of cooperating
might get compromised as the benefit conferred by an individual cooperator on all potential opponents
(including herself) would be non-negligible and could offset the cost of cooperating. Cooperating then
would raise one’s own payoff over what would be earned by defecting, as if an n-person linear public goods
game (see Cohen & Eshel 1976) was being played by the entire group.
22as in Fletcher & Zwick (2000)
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Furthermore assuming that an additive PD is being played, this reduces to
(
2pC1−1
)2 > c
b
,
where R −S = T −P =: b is the benefit conferred by cooperators upon their opponent
(of either type) and P − S(= T −R) =: c is the associated cost. Again, this can clearly
occur for pC1 < 1 as cb < 1. Assuming that high-earning strategies grow at the expense
of underperformers by either differential survival and reproduction or imitation, the
population ratio of cooperators will have risen in the next period, ’although’ it has fallen
in both of the groups. This dynamics, paradoxical as it may appear at first, is perfectly
in line with the simultaneous effects of selection both within and between groups as
alluded to by Darwin: Cooperators get exploited and crowded out by defectors within
each group as expected, yet the biasedness of groups regarding the earnings level of both
types favors cooperators in the first group over defectors in the second. The evolution
of (within-group altruistic) cooperation depends on the relative importance of the two
effects. In the example, the intergroup effect overcompensates the intragroup effect as
long as the difference in the conditional probabilities of playing a cooperator (termed
’index of assortativity’ by Bergstrom 2003),
pCC −pCD =φpC1+
(
1−φ)pC2− [ψpC1+ (1−ψ)pC2]= (2pC1−1)2 , (3.3)
exceeds the cost-benefit ratio of cooperating.23
23 The example, of course, does not speak to the long-run survival of altruism. Within-group competition
would eventually have defectors crowd out cooperators in a system like the one portrayed here. See Fletcher
& Zwick (2000) for computer simulations of the longer-run properties of populations which initially give
rise to Simpson’s Paradox.
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3.2 Selfish Genes, Inclusive Fitness, and the Group Selec-
tion Debate
Darwin’s account of the different levels at which selection works at the same time against
and in favor of altruists did not prevent the idea of “group selection” from becoming
the subject of an ongoing intellectual controversy among biologists and beyond. Resis-
tance had formed in the 1960’s against group selection models as in Wynne-Edwards
(1962), where groups with high proportions of altruists were taken as adaptive units in
their own right, turning a blind eye to competitive pressures within groups. George C.
Williams’s response to these ’naive’ group selection models was to insist on the gene
as the fundamental selection target24, driving home the point that groups are too un-
stable and ephemeral to be considered as an object of evolution in themselves. The
criticismmet by group selection theory grew even stronger when biologists developed
apparent alternatives where no reference to the adaptive qualities of groups was deemed
necessary.25
24Williams (1966)
25One of the most widely cited examples in this context is Robert Trivers’s analysis of reciprocity (Trivers
1971) which is however not particularly relevant for the present study: The explanatory value of the Trivers
theory relates to how an equilibrium of mutual cooperation can be sustained when both agents play Tit-
for-Tat in an IPD, which has been rejected as a modeling framework in the context of modern large-scale
societies where idiosyncratic business relations cannot be taken for granted. From this perspective, Trivers
does not necessarily address the phenomenon of genuine altruism (which is why he could equally well
have used the term ’reciprocal selfishness’ as opposed to ’reciprocal altruism’, as had been suggested by a
reviewer, see Field (2001, p. 126).)
In fact, Alexander Field points out that whether reciprocity in repeated games qualifies as selfish or
altruistic depends on its current frequency in the population. This ambiguity about the nature of recip-
rocal behavior relates nicely to the phenomenon of multiple equilibria in an IPD where players choose
between the trigger strategy and the strategy of continual defection contingent on expectations about
their opponent’s move, as already explained (see section 2.3.2). According to Field, the Trivers model —
while it explains how reciprocity serves to sustain (nonaltruistic) cooperation — does not explain how
reciprocity originates from a situation where (altruistically) operating in low frequency. In other words,
the Trivers model just like classical game theory leaves the problem of why and how IPD participants
coordinate on the cooperative outcome of the resulting Stag Hunt unaddressed. Brian Skyrms (2004),
arguing that repeated-game effects are relevant to collective action problems, explores how population
structure affects equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt by facilitating the transition from the uncooperative
to the cooperative equilibrium.
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At the heart of William D. Hamilton’s theory of kin selection (Hamilton 1963) is an idea
which had surfaced before in Williams &Williams (1957), where attention was called to
the fact that most early-in-life interactions necessarily occur among parent animals and
their offspring. Hamilton’s theory builds on the premise that altruistic acts by humans and
other animals are preferentially conferred among close relatives, which are likely to share
significant parts of their genetic composition. A subtle shift in perspective here makes
self-sacrificing altruists appear to serve an interest of their (genetic) self: Individuals
would willingly compromise themselves in part, expecting enhanced genetic prospects
to enjoy. On a semantic level, Hamilton’s original term inclusive fitness succinctly points
out the essence of kin selection theory, defining individuals’ fitness to extend to close
relatives, backed up by genetic relatedness.
Richard Dawkins’s theory of the selfish gene (Dawkins 1989) goes even further and focuses
the analysis on alleles which combine to different genotypes in different individuals.
Individuals here reduce to mere “vehicles of selection”, admitted to the picture only as
common destinies of different genes which happen to share the same boat in the fitness
race. After the differential survival and reproduction of individuals, genes which had
enjoyed above-average fitness across their differentmanifestations in different individuals
will be overrepresented in the updated population. This observation leaves no room for
altruistic individuals in a scenario where fitness is discerned purely at the level of genes.
Inclusive fitness and selfish gene theories were commonly perceived to play down the
interest in groups (and in individuals, in the latter case) as adaptive units and discredit
’apparently’ altruistic behavior as selfishness in disguise, which led many to believe that
the group selection argument was not only implausible but also uncalled for.
3.3 Multi-Level Selection
Sober &Wilson (1998) argue persuasively that inclusive fitness and selfish gene theories
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do not lend themselves to a rejection of the group selection idea. They propose to rather
understand both paradigms as specific perspectives adopted within a more comprehen-
sive approach to evolution, namely multi-level selection, which they view as a “unified
evolutionary theory of social behavior”. In fact, the group selection debate demonstrates
that altruism as a behavioral phenomenon to acknowledge (or not) is to quite some extent
at analysts’ discretion. Arguing against group selection and in favor of inclusive fitness
or selfish genes amounts to adopting a specific perspective and consolidating fitness
accounts at the preferred level. On whichever level opted for, it is no surprise to conclude
that anything which evolves simply cannot afford to incur fitness penalties. The alterna-
tive they propose is to make broader and consistent use of Dawkins’s concept of vehicles
of selection and apply it not only to individuals but equally on higher levels. According
to this view, natural selection occurs and should be taken into account at all levels of
association with fitness differences among the constituents. The hierarchy of possible
selection targets ranges from chromosomes in a gene, genes in individuals, individuals
in (kin or non-kin) groups, to groups in a population. Regarding kin selection theory,
altruistic propensities are penalized within kin groups, yet families containing many
altruists are favored over kin groups which do not. As for selfish gene theory, selfish genes
are favored over altruistic genes within individuals, yet individuals with high proportions
of altruistic genes outcompete individuals with high proportions of selfish genes which
feed on and pose risks for their host organism.26
Charles Darwin in his example invokes two levels at which selection pressures simultane-
ously operate: the level of the individual and the level of the group (or “tribe”). Thinking
along the lines of multi-level selection enables analysts to appreciate the same behav-
ior as both altruistic at the lower level of the individual and adaptive at the level of the
group. Of course, altruism will only evolve if the beneficial effect accruing to altruists
26As for (genuine) reciprocal altruism— in an IPD of fixed and known duration— Sober andWilson’s
point is that a reciprocator is penalized within mixed ’groups’ of a reciprocator facing an unconditional
defector, yet two reciprocators when playing each other (’groups’ of reciprocators) do better than defectors
among themselves. Unlike in the infinitely repeated IPD, reciprocity here unambiguously qualifies as
altruistic as it implies to refrain from safely exploiting an opponent on the last encounter from which on no
future punishment is possible.
3. Evolutionary Biology, Group Selection, and Altruism 37
in high-performing groups as opposed to selfish types in low-performing groups offsets
or overcompensates altruists’ fitness penalties within both of the groups. In Sober and
Wilson’s terms, the virtue of the multi-level approach is to circumvent the “averaging
fallacy”, which would amount to consider only the net effect and (tautologically) conclude
that any behavior which evolves cannot be genuinely altruistic.
The appropriate dose of averaging and accordingly the demarcation between altruism and
selfishness is of course no trivial issue. Wilson and Sober’s urging not to commit the aver-
aging fallacy has recently been criticized in Tullberg (2003) as an invitation to the “average
negligence”. Among Tullberg’s examples is firms’ giving away of complimentary sample
merchandise without any immediate returns, which he proposes to view as an “integral
part of a chosen strategy” carried out (by nomeans altruistically) in order to introduce
new products or increase sales numbers. In fact, it is precisely on these grounds that an
outcome of mutual cooperation achieved by reciprocators in the infinitely repeated IPD
qualifies as nonaltruistic: Two reciprocators in an IPD constantly refrain from exploiting
their opponent, and one would be led to diagnose them with altruism when considering
each interaction separately. Contemplating the entire sequence of play, however, the
punishment costs of defection would outweigh the one-time gains from exploitation,
so that defection at any time would lower rather than increase individual (cumulative)
earnings. It seems reasonable to combine the returns of multiple transactions into an
earnings aggregate for the strategy of playing TFT as opposed to continual defection,
as they accrue to one and the same strategist. Yet it seems uncalled for to consolidate
earnings accruing to distinct recipients — of the same type but in different groups as in
Simpson’s Paradox — into a hypothetical average. In fact, cooperating in the one-shot
PD (as well as not defecting in the last stage of a fixed and known duration IPD) can be
argued to be unambiguously altruistic vis-a-vis any opponent actually played, as it entails
lower earnings for oneself and higher earnings for the opponent than would result from
defecting.27
27See Field (2001, p. 123).
3. Evolutionary Biology, Group Selection, and Altruism 38
Multi-level selection thinking lends itself to an appreciation of cooperation in the one-shot
PD. Besides rendering Simpson’s Paradox less puzzling than it might appear at first glance,
it advances the understanding of altruism by biologists and economists alike: The ground
is cleared to acknowledge that cooperation in the example given in section 3.1 amounts
to an act of (within-group) altruism although it was shown to have evolved. Likewise, the
theory of multi-level selection points out favorable payoff margins for cooperators which
escape the study of a given encounter but result from the interaction structure at the
population level. It thus offers a possible explanation why behavior such as contributing
anonymously to charity or providing unilateral help to others — although inconsistent
with the maximization of individual wealth—may persist in a competitive environment,
at least for some time. The next section is concerned with the longer run.
3.4 Modeling Group Selection: Islands andHaystacks
At the heart of Simpson’s Paradox is a positive correlatedness of strategies at the popula-
tion level: Unlike in the standard evolutionary setting, cooperative moves are more likely
to be faced with cooperation than are defective moves. In the example of ’hard-wired’
player types predisposed to either cooperate or defect in each encounter, such corre-
latedness arises from the assumed biased partitioning of the population with regard to
types and the restriction on play to occur only within each of the groups. An evolutionary
account of sustainable within-group altruism in this framework amounts to explaining
how groups with sufficiently high variation regarding their cooperator-defector ratio
are established and how this variation evolves over time. While parents and offspring
naturally share important parts of their genetic composition as emphasized by the kin
selection approach, multilevel selectionmodels of altruistic cooperation in sporadic inter-
actions (among unrelated members) must address the issue of how cooperative behavior
tends to concentrate in isolated sub-populations. To complicate the picture, isolated
cooperative milieus —while necessary for altruism to evolve in a group selection model
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— are unstable in the long run: Due to the altruistic nature of cooperation, defectors
grow at the expense of cooperators within all groups. If groups remain forever isolated,
within-group dynamics will have defectors take over all groups as evolution proceeds,
eventually eliminating the asymmetry of groups which is essential to the group effect.
JohnMaynard Smith (1964) proposed the widely influential haystack model as a frame-
work in order to formally study the workings of group selection. In the haystack model,
groups take the form of mice living in the different haystacks on a meadow which are set
up in spring and torn down after the summer. After the haystacks have been cleared, the
mice blend back into the meadow population for the winter, and the process repeats itself
year after year. Part of Maynard Smith’s motivation to build and study the haystack model
were his doubts about the evolution of altruism by group as opposed to kin selection.
In fact, he believed it to depend on unlikely events (like genetic drift pushing altruists
to fixation in some of the groups as in the earlier ’islands’ model by Wright 1945) while
sibling groups come with considerable variance regarding their proportion of altruists
without further ado. Maynard Smith assumes that haystacks are founded by females who
have been fertilized as a result of randommating in the meadow population. In contrast
to kin selectionmodels —where siblings disperse andmate to start new sibgroups after
each interaction — the group structure in a haystack model remains intact for several
interaction rounds (“breeding generations”), and the sibgroups evolve into local subpop-
ulations before dispersal. To analyze the model, Maynard Smith subjected altruists to
drastically unfavorable within-group dynamics: Altruists not only reduce in frequency
but are eliminated in the course of a breeding phase in all initially mixed groups. Such
powerful within-group selection against altruists led Maynard Smith to conclude that
group selection (viewed as an alternative to kin selection) cannot convincingly explain
the evolution of altruism.28
28Ted Bergstrom (2002) argues that if cooperation is to survive in this scenario (which can only occur in
initially homogeneous groups of two cooperators), it has to be of the “seemingly altruistic” as opposed to
genuinely altruistic kind. Bergstrom looks at the cumulative numbers of offspring born to either type over
the different breeding generations during a season and understands them as the earnings in a game played
among the haystack founders. Such a game between founders at the beginning of a breeding phase can
be shown to turn out as a Stag Hunt, where two cooperators play best responses to each other. As with all
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Wilson (1987) considers a haystack model where altruists reduce in frequency instead of
disappearing outright in all mixed groups. This specification allows him to address the
role played by the number of generations spent in isolated groups: While thewithin-group
dynamics can run its course and tends to eliminate altruists as this number increases,
Wilson points out that altruists go by nomeans extinct during the first few generations
when Maynard Smith’s drastic assumption concerning mixed groups is relaxed. The
resulting model is at the same time more realistic and more balanced than Maynard
Smith’s, in that it allows altruists to benefit from the fact that longer group duration
reinforces not only the intragroup but also the intergroup effect: Wilson shows that for a
number of interactions in isolated groups, the growing productivity differential between
groups (much like accumulating sampling error as long as groups have not yet grown
too large) causes sibgroups’ initial variation regarding the altruistic allele to increase
from generation to generation. When haystacks are cleared and recolonized at suitable
intervals, the beneficial effect from spending multiple generations within groups can
offset the detrimental one. Group selection as exemplified by the haystack model turns
out as possibly more favorable for the evolution of altruism than “pure” kin selection.
Cooper & Wallace (2004) study a closely related model where groups of repeated one-
shot PD players are randomly formed by drawing without replacement from a non-large
population. An analytical result establishes that multigenerational groups are in fact
necessary for within-group altruism to evolve in this case: Unlike in the haystack type
models, no sibgroup effect operates in the first generation right after group formation.
“[I]mmediate and random rematching” thus renders the group structure ineffective. The
scenario reduces to the standard evolutionary setting where altruism cannot evolve. For
lack of analytical solutions, Cooper and Wallace investigate the role of multigenerational
analyses of multi-level selection, the (non)altruistic qualities of cooperation depend on the level at which
earnings are consolidated. In a similar vein but contemplating the interactions during a breeding phase
separately as one-shot PDs, Skyrms (2004, p. 8) points out that the within-group dynamics of Maynard
Smith’s model induces “perfect correlation of types” after the first breeding. The evolution of cooperation
then comes as no surprise, as “it is a defining characteristic of the prisoner’s dilemma that cooperators do
better against themselves than defectors do against defectors”. Yet cooperating in the one-shot PD can
safely be said to retain its altruistic flavor also in this case, as it means to forgo gains from exploiting a
defenseless opponent.
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groups by means of agent-based simulations. In line with Wilson’s conclusions, they find
that the global proportion of altruists after its initial decline can recover and rise above its
initial level (after g interactions) as the time spent in intact groups increases. Eventually it
must drop (falling short of its initial level at g¯ ) and collapse when mutations are included
to rule out persistently homogeneous groups full of altruists. The upshot is that within-
group altruism among non-kin can survive even in this case rather than depending on
the unlikely event of an initially homogeneous group full of altruists. Altruism within
randomly formed groups can coexist in cycles with selfish behavior in the long run when
the rhythm of group break-up and reform implies a number of interactions spent within
groups in the range between g and g¯ (which depend, of course, on the parameter values
of the model).
3.5 Summary and Discussion
Group selection still remains a source of some controversy in evolutionary biology. This
might come as a surprise considering that group selection is about nothing more (and
nothing less) than a different (if possibly unorthodox) way of approaching uncontroversial
phenomena. According to Reeve (2000), Sober and Wilson themselves are partly to blame
as parts of their book suggest that group selection is materially distinct and in some cases
superior to other frameworks of fitness maximization such as selfish gene and inclusive
fitness theories.
In any case, there is no need to pit group selection against the ’orthodox’ theories in
order to demonstrate its usefulness in economics. As pointed out by Zywicki (2000), the
language of multi-level selection lends itself perfectly to phrase the core idea of a theory
of the firm à la Alchian & Demsetz (1972): Firms are collections of individuals, and more
successful firms set themselves apart from less successful ones in that their employees
achieve higher gains from teamwork or, for that matter, cooperation. The monitor comes
into play because free riders see firms with high levels of teamwork as an invitation to
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shirk and live on their co-workers’ efforts, thereby undermining successful firms from
within.
At the end of chapter 2 it was noted that structure plays a crucial role for the evolution of
cooperation in the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Multi-level selection theory can be seen
as an open invitation to import this insight into an analysis of altruism in the one-shot
case. It might however be argued that humans do not live in haystacks. The next chapter
is about how to deal with this observation.
Chapter 4
Assortation, Signals, and Religion
The point of departure for this chapter is Cooper and Wallace’s observation that when
groups persist for several generations, matching of players becomes and for some time
remains positively-assortative at the population level despite the fact that groups are
initiated at random: Random sampling does not prevent some groups from containing
more cooperators than others. As the high-altruism groups outgrow low-altruism ones, a
cooperator’s odds of meeting a cooperator will come to exceed a defector’s for a certain
period of time. Strategies thus get positively correlated and Simpson’s Paradox obtains
just like in the oversimplified two-period example (see section 3.1) where nonrandom
matches were presupposed by assuming cooperators to mysteriously associate in the first
group and of defectors in the second. Yet the redispersal of groups at suitable intervals is
essential for such assortation to constantly re-develop in the long run. Otherwise it would
get eliminated as defectors take over all groups from within.
If assortative play in the sense of nonrandom encounters can obtain despite random
sampling as long as groups disband and reform at the ’right’ pace, this does not however
answer the question of why different groups exist in the first place, especially with regard
to increasingly integrating large-scale economies. Signals are an evident mechanism in
43
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this regard and can naturally explain why an otherwise anonymous society gets structured
at all and how such structure leads to positively assortative interactions. Again, a simple
example cannot harm in making issues clear. To investigate the role of signaling in the
evolution of within-group altruism, consider a large population ofNC players ’hard-wired’
to cooperate and ND players conditioned to defect as before and introduce a commonly
observable signal which players can send or not. Assume that the fraction pSC ∈ (0,1)
of cooperators who send the signal is different from the fraction pSD ∈ (0,1) of defectors
who do so. Interactions require the mutual consent of both partners involved and a
large number of potential opponents are immediately available. Assume further that
signal-sending cooperators just like signaling defectors for some reason (earnings-related
or not) insist on playing only partners who send the signal like they do. In the simplest
case, players have an in-built preference to interact only with the likes of them as far as
the (non)display of the signal is concerned. Alternatively, agents could be understood to
care about their material success: Cooperators could be seen as prudently escaping the
role of an exploitation victim and defectors as consistently chasing their prey. When the
indicative value of the signal, i. e. the connection between the display of the signal and
individuals’ types, is known to agents (consciously or implicitly), signaling cooperators
like signaling defectors will refuse to play nonsignalers. In either case, play is limited to
occur among signalers on the one hand and among nonsignalers on the other.
Interactions in this example are much as if the population were partitioned into two
groups: the ’group’ of signalers and the ’group’ of nonsignalers. Comparing the propor-
tions of cooperators within the two groups, it is straightforward to see that
pSCNC
pSCNC +pSDND
<
(
1−pSC
)
NC(
1−pSC
)
NC +
(
1−pSD
)
ND
(4.1)
⇔ pSC < pSD
Quite intuitively, the signaling ’group’ has a lower ratio of cooperators compared to the
nonsignaling ’group’ if the proportion of cooperators who display the signal is smaller
than the proportion of defectors who do. The inequality in (4.1) can in this case be
4. Assortation, Signals, and Religion 45
rewritten as
(
pSC −pSD
)( pSCNC
pSCNC +pSDND
)
> (pSC −pSD)( (1−pSC )NC(
1−pSC
)
NC +
(
1−pSD
)
ND
)
or equivalently
pSC
(
pSCNC
pSCNC +pSDND
)
+ (1−pSC )( (1−pSC )NC(
1−pSC
)
NC +
(
1−pSD
)
ND
)
> pSD
(
pSCNC
pSCNC +pSDND
)
+ (1−pSD)( (1−pSC )NC(
1−pSC
)
NC +
(
1−pSD
)
ND
)
,
which reduces to
pCC > pCD ,
where pCC (pCD ) are a cooperator’s (defector’s) population-level odds of playing a cooper-
ator. When cooperators are less inclined to display the signal than defectors, cooperators
are hence more likely to play a cooperator than are defectors. Exactly the same bias in
cooperators’ and defectors’ chances to play a cooperator arises when pSC > pSD , i. e.
in the more ’natural’ case where cooperators are overrepresented in the ’group’ where
the signal is displayed. If interactions are sufficiently assortative (see equation (3.3) for
an interpretation of the difference pCC − pCD in terms of assortativity), within-group
altruistic cooperation can evolve by Simpson’s Paradox.
This example highlights the crucial issues to address in order to take signaling as a
convincing explanation for the long-run survival of altruism: What is the nature of the
signal, and why is it that cooperators and defectors differ persistently in their ability
or inclination to send it? As a thought experiment, assume in the example that the
(non)display of the signal is a genetic (or social) trait ’wired’ into an individual just like her
propensity to cooperate or to defect. Altruism then cannot survive in the long run even if a
sufficiently high difference in the two types’ signaling propensities—which narrows down
as evolution proceeds— is presupposed for the first generation on whichever grounds.
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Nonaltruistic signalers as well as nonsignalers eventually crowd out their altruistic ’in-
group’ opponents as the descendants or imitators of defectors and cooperators inherit the
display of the signal with the same ease. The signal ceases to indicate agents’ types and
interactions become random as ’fake’ signalers undermine the system. The population
operates as if mixed groups in Simpson’s Paradox were permanently isolated andmust
eventually converge to an all-selfish state. A natural avenue for the long-run survival
of altruism hence is a differential ability or inclination to display the signal: The theory
of costly signaling to be discussed in the following builds on the premise that it is more
difficult or less advantageous for defectors to send a specific signal than for cooperators.29
The next sections review and discusses different forms that such signals could take,
religion include .
4.1 Moral Sentiments
Robert Frank (1988) in his book Passions Within Reason persuasively argues that an
individual’s emotional and motivational state becomes manifest in observable symptoms
which are (at last in part) beyond conscious manipulation and can therefore serve as a
reliable signal of one’s commitment to cooperate evenwhen individual self-interest would
counsel defection, as in the one-shot PD. Frank’s analysis can be seen as elaborating on the
idea of “constrained maximization” among “translucent” players in Gauthier (1986) (see
Binmore 1994, ch. 3.2.2). Gauthier considers players who turn a blind eye to the earnings
from exploitation and can therefore commit to a strategy of returning the like of their
opponent’s move. When such constrainedmaximizers can reliably communicate their
commitment to opponents, mutual cooperation becomes possible as a Nash equilibrium
outcome (along with mutual defection). Frank takes the idea of translucency to an
evolutionary setting and proposes two kinds of signals to convey information about an
individual’s hard-wired strategy: “sincere manners” and reputation.
29The theory of costly signaling was introduced in biology as the ’Handicap Principle’ by Zahavi (1975).
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The array of symptoms forming a persistently fraud-resistant signal of commitment —
sent more easily by cooperators than by defectors — in the “sincere manners pathway to
moral sentiments” includes facial expressions, body language, pitch and timbre of voice,
and other dimensions of the physiognomy. In the extreme case where cooperative intent
manifests itself in symptoms which no defector can display like cooperators do, emotions
translate into an appearance and demeanor which indicate a player’s type with perfect
accuracy. In a similar vein, Frank deals with the “reputation pathway” and argues that a
favorable reputation can signal a commitment to cooperate, although its indicative value
in the context of altruistic cooperation is by no means evident: To altruistically cooperate
means to refrain from cheating in a situation where no detection (and hence future
punishment) is possible. As a consequence, nonaltruists by defecting in (only) these
situations will by definition never compromise their reputation and could thus perfectly
’fake’ the signal. Frank argues that nonaltruists reveal their true spirit nevertheless. Not
all interactions in life are ’safe’ for defectors (in the sense that cheating simply cannot be
detected). Nonaltruists in order to preserve their favorable reputation need to restrain
themselves and refrain from defecting in precisely these instances. In this regard, they
face an “implementation problem”: Psychological findings known as the ’matching law’
suggest that when rewards from defecting are not safe yet immediate (as opposed to
the rewards from preserving one’s reputation which may not arrive until much later in
time), subjects find it hard to be patient enough. In the extreme case, it is assumed that
nonaltruists can impossibly build a favorable reputation while altruists — who never
defect — naturally have it.
The implications of the two signal variants for the evolution of altruistic cooperation
are the same. If signalers’ preference to stay with their like or, equivalently, cooperators’
prudence not to get exploited tells them to beware of defectors (which they know to reveal
themselves by not sending the signal in the latter case), strategies are perfectly correlated
from the start. Interactions are structured much like from the second generation onward
in the haystack model (assuming that at least one homogeneous haystack full of coopera-
tors got colonized), and cooperators drive defectors to distinction. Genuinely altruistic
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or not, the survival of cooperation in this case is not very convincing as it depends on
mutations to be ruled out: Clearly, a signaler whose type changes for some unexplained
reason and her progeny would take over the cooperative milieu. A more general model
with partially reliable signals addresses this problem.
In Frank (1987) a signal is displayed by all individuals and takes the form of a continuous
variable influenced by both genetic and random components. Players draw their individ-
ual signal levels from two different densities such that cooperators by genetic influence
have a higher mean signal level than defectors. The two signal densities overlap in a way
which makes the signal partially reliable: Values under a lower threshold are only drawn
by defectors, while values above an upper one are only drawn by cooperators. Signal
values between the two threshold levels are however drawn by cooperators and defectors
alike. Signal ’fakes’, albeit imperfect, are hence admitted to the picture. Conditional on
the signal value of potential opponents, agents in this model can either choose to play
their ’hard-wired’ strategy in a PD or to take an outside option which here yields the same
earnings as two defectors in a PD would receive. While defectors’ expected earnings are
higher in the PD than from the outside option irrespective of their opponent’s type, coop-
erators are faced with a trade-off: Playing a cooperator in the PD yields higher earnings
than the outside option, but victims of exploitation by a defector receive less than the
outside option. Frank shows that cooperators who account for the exploitation risk in the
PD by requiring a minimum signal from opponents they play with can end up with the
same average earnings30 as defectors in a stable polymorphic equilibrium, depending on
the parameters on the model.
30Which, as has been argued, does not rule out within-group altruism in the ’mixed’ encounters. Frank
(1994) acknowledges the usefulness of the multi-level perspective; originally he viewed selection as operat-
ing only at the individual level. See Field (2001, ch. 4) for a discussion.
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4.2 Moral Sentiments, Cognitive Misers, and Embedded-
ness
Both “detection” (of possibly misleading signals of commitment) and “projection” (i. e.
ascribing one’s own intention to others) are explored by Macy & Skvoretz (1998) in their
agent-based model of cooperation among strangers. Yet rather than taking these mecha-
nisms for granted as in Frank (1988, 1987) and in Orbell & Dawes (1991)31, respectively,
Macy and Skvoretz ask whether they can come to evolve in competitive settings.
Interactions in this model are “embedded” in the sense that agents belong to one of
several “neighborhoods”. Each agent pairs with one of her neighbors in a certain fraction
of encounters and with a “stranger” in the rest. Agents decide in each encounter to either
engage in a PD game or resort to an outside option (valued equal to or greater than the
earnings frommutual defection). Agents are represented as bit strings (like in Ashlock
et al. 1996) which encode a wide variety of behavior: In each pairing, agents can (but
need not) base their decision to play rather than use the outside option on an assumption
about how potential opponents will behave in case the interaction gets consummated.
This assumption (if applicable) may involve projection of one’s own intentions onto
others, as is assumed in Orbell and Dawes, or the opposite, i. e. expecting that potential
opponents’ intentions of defecting or cooperating run contrary to one’s own. are about to
make the opposite move behavior in will either behave like themselves if an interaction
is consummated. Agents can also base their decision to participate in the game on a
“marker” displayed by potential opponents. Yet unlike in Frank’s model, where telltale
clues by assumption allow inferences about their senders’ commitment to cooperate, this
marker is available to all agents independent of their cooperative or defective disposition.
Another criterion available to agents is membership in their own neighborhood, the
decision rule being to play neighbors and run away from strangers or vice versa. Agents
31the example given in section 2.5 of how the evolutionary approach encompasses the one-shot case
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using more than one of these criteria will engage in a PD with a potential opponent with a
probability corresponding to the proportion of favorable pieces among the information
received, while agents using none of them will either play in all encounters or not at
all. When interactions get consummated, agents are disposed either to unconditionally
defect or cooperate or alternatively to defect against strangers only and while cooperating
with neighbors.
Strategies in Macy and Skvoretz’s model evolve by selection andmutation according to
a genetic algorithm which operates after each round of pairings but takes into account
a weighted average of both current and previous earnings. More successful strategies
spread only by “social contact” in the sense that an encounter (or even a consummated
interaction, in some specifications) is required for a relatively wealthy agent to pass
on parts of her ’genes’ to someone else. Macy and Skvoretz find that agents (starting
from a random distribution of strategies) generally prefer an attractive outside option
—valued higher than the earnings frommutual defection— over engaging in the PD in
the first phase of a typical simulation run. This allows cooperative intentions (towards
neighbors and strangers alike) to spread by random drift, in some neighborhoods more
so than in others. Agents in a neighborhood where cooperative intentions have become
disproportionately frequent can then start successful cooperation and with their wealth
serve as rolemodels within their community. In their contacts with strangers, members of
the ’cooperative’ neighborhood will export cooperative attitudes to other groups and thus
create a population-wide climate for the emergence of a willingness to play the one-shot
PDwith strangers. The transition from parochial (meaning to avoid strangers and transact
only with neighbors) to universal cooperation here occurs via either projection and/or
detection, which allow ’open-minded’ cooperators to find and consummate interactions
among themselves. Macy and Skvoretz’s simulations indicate that a population with
universal cooperation is quite robust against subversion: Mutants who evolve to defect
against their neighbors will of course catch on within their community. The unraveling of
cooperation caused by amutant in one neighborhood cannot however spread by contacts
among strangers to ’healthy’ neighborhoods where no mutation has occurred and wealth
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is relatively high, making them insusceptible to a strategy which at home is already
eating into the foundations of its own success. On the other hand, agents who evolve
to selectively cheat on strangers (e. g. by faking the marker associated with cooperative
play) cause transaction between strangers to be ceased population-wide: After “infecting”
their own neighborhood due to the exploitation gains earned, all agents who interact
with members of this community will get adapted to the danger of being exploited in
anonymous encounters by reclaiming the outside option. Selective pressures against
agents prepared to cooperate with strangers is hence weakened, which allows these
agents to again concentrate in one of the groups by random drift and evolve projecting
and detection methods anew.
Macy and Skvoretz conclude that there is no need to outright assume the fraud-resistance
of Frank’s telltale clues and the projection strategy of Orbell and Dawes’s cognitive misers.
Both avenues to the evolution of altruism can emerge and be sustained endogenously as
a punctuated equilibrium in which the society experiences cooperation break-downs and
recoveries alike. What instead drives their model (in addition to a comfortable outside op-
tion and their specification of the selection criterion) are socially distinct subpopulations,
preferably those which are small relative to the population. As an example they invoke
MaxWeber’s Protestant Sects.
4.3 MaxWeber’s ’Protestant Sects’
MaxWeber (1970), when traveling the United States of the early 20th century, observed
that affiliation to one of the various churches of the country traditionally played an
important role when it came to initiating business relationships:
“Hardly a generation ago when businessmenwere establishing themselves
and making new social contacts, they encountered the question: ’To what
church do you belong?”’ (p. 303)
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Referring to Baptists, e. g., Weber reports that “[a]dmission to the congregation is recog-
nized as an absolute guarantee of the moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those
qualities required in business matters” (p. 305). According to Weber, Baptist affiliation
serves as a signal because the admission to the Protestant sects in America — unlike
churches in e. g. France and Germany— requires applicants to pass “the most careful
probation and [...] closest inquiries into conduct going back to early childhood” (p. 305).
Moreover, Weber hints at the fact that membership was quite costly also in financial
terms:
“It should be realized, in addition, that church affiliation in the U.S.A.
brings with it incomparably higher financial burdens, especially for the poor,
than anywhere in Germany.” (p. 302)
The importance of belonging to a specific church (or sect) got less important over time so
that whenWeber visited the country,
“[...] the kind of denomination [to which one belongs] is rather irrelevant.
It does not matter whether one be Freemason, Christian Scientist, Adventist,
Quaker, or what not. What is decisive is that one be admitted to membership
by ’ballot,’ after an examination and an ethical probation in the sense of the
virtues which are at a premium for the inner-worldly asceticism of Protes-
tantism and hence, for the ancient puritan tradition. Then, the same effect
could be observed.” (p. 307)
Weber emphasizes that although these associations also served as a lender of resort in
times of financial distress, the signaling value of the emblem used by members in order
to identify themselves concerned primarily one’s intentions:
“Andhence the badge in the buttonholemeant, ’I ama gentlemanpatented
after investigation and probation and guaranteed by mymembership’. Again,
this meant, in business life above all, tested credit worthiness.” (p. 308; his
italics)
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Boudon (1987) points out howWeber’s appreciation of the signaling value of membership
in the Protestant sects relates to the special requirements of the U.S. society, which resem-
bled today’s large-scale and depersonalized economies already in Weber’s days (at least
when compared with France and Germany). Boudon summarizes Weber’s impressions
as follows: “In the United States social and geographic mobility are greater; ethnic het-
erogeneity is greater; the stratification system is less rigid; and the stratification symbols
are less visible and less marked than in France or Germany.” The Protestant sects in the
U.S. then can be understood as a functional equivalent to e. g. the légion d’honneur in
France, which served as an important symbol system associated with high entry costs.
The lower demand for symbols and the existence of alternatives in Europe also explain
why sects with by their careful screening of applicants and imposition of entry costs were
qualitatively different from churches, as emphasized by Weber:
“It is crucial that sect membership meant a certificate of moral qualifi-
cation and especially of business morals for the individual. This stands in
contrast to membership in a ’church’ into which one is ’born’ and which lets
grace shine over the righteous and the unrighteous alike. Indeed, a church is
a corporation which organizes grace and administers religious gifts of grace,
like an endowed foundation. Affiliation with the church is, in principle, oblig-
atory and hence proves nothing with regard to the member’s qualities. A sect,
however, is a voluntary association of only those who, according to the princi-
ple, are religiously and morally qualified. If one finds voluntary reception of
hismembership, by virtue of religious probation, he joins the sect voluntarily.”
(p. 305f)
Weber’s observations date back to over one hundred years ago. How do they relate to
today’s large-scale western economies? Social structure is, of course, based in part on
common values, and religion still has its place in the matrix of values in the society.
Yet church membership per se is nowadays anything else than obligatory and involves
significant costs as well as time (if practiced). Hence it seems problematic to simply apply
Macy and Skvoretz’s premise — that all members of society firmly and invariably belong
to one sect or, for that matter, group— to the contemporary world. Secularism in today’s
occidental societies makes it even more interesting to investigate the role of religious
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involvement in a group selection approach to the evolution of altruistic cooperation. Or,
to borrow the term from Schlicht (1995), how can religion (if only accidentally) act as a
“seed crystal” for high-altruism groups in mobile societies?
4.4 Religious Signaling and the Costly-to-Fake Principle
Religious involvement entails costs (e. g., sacrificing energy and time in order to perform
mandatory rituals) as well as returns (in this world or elsewhere). In a standard signaling
model, individuals evaluate the net benefit of producing a signal to the effect that agents
of one type find it more and agents of the other type find it less worthwhile to do so. In a
separating equilibrium, the extent to which an agent produces the signal allows to infer
her type.32 Applied to the evolution of altruism via religious signaling, the story would
be that joining a religious congregation is worthwhile for cooperators while it is not for
defectors and membership can hence serve as a fraud-resistant signal of their intentions
(see e. g. Irons (2001) or Sosis & Alcorta 2003).
It is intuitive to assume that a genuine interest in the activities carried out in the realm of
religion and hence religious participation correlates heavily with an individual’s commit-
ment to cooperate in the one-shot PD: After all, cooperators in a PD game unmistakably
demonstrate their readiness to content themselves with lower-than-possible material
wealth, which distinguishes them from defectors. If some consistency in behavior can be
presupposed one should expect cooperators to be less deterred than defectors by the time
and energy consuming nature of religious rituals which entail no proximate resource gains
in return. Yet the question is of course more involved: If cooperators tend to cluster in the
religious milieu and achieve high levels of productivity, nonbelieving defectors can be
supposed to take notice. Sosis (2003) develops a model to address precisely the question
32The classical reference in economics is, of course, Spence (1973) who shows that the amount of
education taken by an individual can serve as a signal for her abilities.
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of why defectors do not to engage in religious activity despite the benefits associated with
the more productive climate in religious communities. In his example of the Hutterites —
a religious group living in rural North America which enjoys “extraordinary reproductive
success”— it becomes obvious that being part of a religious group in someway or another
entails positive net fitness advantages over nonmembers. From an evolutionary point
of view one would hence expect believing cooperators as well as nonbelieving defectors
to join the group regardless of the costly rituals mandated. Sosis resolves this puzzle by
arguing that individuals’ subjectively perceived costs of these rituals are central to the
joining decision rather than type-independent resource costs. Subjectively perceived
costs can in fact differ across types because an individual’s actions and her beliefs are
not independent from each other: Self-attribution and cognitive dissonance theories33
suggest that defectors incur psychological costs when performing rituals which believing
cooperators do not: While believers’ actions and attitudes are in line, defectors suffer from
a conflict between the two. Sosis in his static model concludes that religious communities
can adjust their ritual requirements to a level where the representative cooperator joins
the community whereas the representative defector stays out.
4.5 Summary and Discussion
How can group selection come into play in human societies, especially in those with high
degrees of both geographic and social mobility? JohnMaynard Smith’s mice dwell and
interact in isolated haystacks by definition, some of which contain larger proportions of
cooperative strategies than others. This chapter has picked up the idea that such assor-
tation can obtain in human societies when a player’s cooperative intent is discernible
33In short, self-attribution theory is about how (overtly or covertly) performed actions create and mould
attitudes which allow an individual to make sense of herself. Cognitive dissonance theory maintains that
when actions are in contradiction with attitudes, individuals (consciously or unconsciously) strive to reduce
the resulting discomfort by changing their values or actions. For a demonstration of how these (and other)
findings from psychology advance our understanding of the economy see, e. g., Schlicht (1998).
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from the outside. When potential opponents can base their actions on the display of a
signal such as Frank’s telltale clues, cooperators have at their disposal a means of finding
like-minded cooperators in otherwise anonymous sporadic interactions. In order to take
the telltale clues avenue to group selection seriously one should of course be prepared
to respond to the critique of assuming away the problem. The rhetoric of “green beards”
is due to Dawkins (1989), who disguised the assumption of cooperators monopolizing a
signal of cooperative intentions as illegitimate. Frank’s defense is on empirical grounds,
not only by referring to physiognomic and psychological regularities but also by pointing
to experimental results (see Frank et al. 1993). These findings do not however make it
less worthwhile to explore the possibility of telltale clues evolving in competitive environ-
ments rather than taking them as givens (the more so as there exist ’manuals’ like Ekman
(2002) for improving one’s ability to detect lies, which might in turn help potential liars
improve on their lying skills). Findings from the agent-basedmodel byMacy and Skvoretz
suggest that reliable telltale clues can in fact obtain endogenously when interactions
are “embedded” to a sufficiently high extent. As pointed out by MaxWeber, small-scale
religious communities lend themselves as examples of where embeddedness might come
from. Inmodern societies, however, religious affiliation can hardly be taken as granted.
Instead it is natural — at least from an economist’s perspective — to view religious partici-
pation as creating a costs-benefit tradeoff. A static model concerned with such a tradeoff
has been reported, which motivates the need for a dynamic model of “religious signaling”.
Chapter 5
Religion as a Seed Crystal for Altruism:
An Ecological Model
Turning to an evolutionary account of within-group altruism and hence the competition
for resources earned in the PD, the implications of Sosis’s model are clear: When ritual
requirements can be made so intense that all defectors prefer to stay among themselves,
cooperators in the religious milieu can not only flourish but will eventually crowd out
defectors. The population would in the long run converge to an all-Hutterite state as their
“extraordinary reproductive success” would be indefinitely sustained. Such dynamics
driven by homogeneous groups are however not entirely satisfying, as mutations would
drastically change the picture: When a firmly nonbelieving defector (resisting cognitive
dissonance) gravitates towards the excellent opportunities for exploitation in the religious
milieu, the community will get undermined fromwithin. The signaling value of religion
reduces to zero as evolution proceeds, and the long-run equilibrium population will
consist entirely of (nonsignaling) defectors.
In the Sosis model, cooperators and defectors arrive at opposite decisions about joining
the community or not purely because of the psychological costs imposed on defectors:
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Material benefits as well as costs are taken to be the same for both types. A natural way to
extend themodel and integrate the idea of religious signaling into a full-fledged ecological
model would be to endogenize the resource (opportunity) costs and benefits of religious
involvement on the basis of forgone and gained earnings in the PD interactions. Such
a model will proposed in the following sections. Differential survival and reproduction
on the basis of earnings and the divergent characteristics of believers’ and skeptics’
involvement in religion will simultaneously be taken into account by drawing on the
indirect evolutionary approach.
5.1 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach
Sociobiology takes behavior as hard-wired, i. e. unaffected by conscious choice, and
makes predictions about which behavior will be observed in the long run according
to some selection criterion. A natural extension in the social sciences is the indirect
evolutionary approach, introduced in Güth & Yaari (1992), which puts preference-based
strategic choices to an evolutionary test: Players in indirect evolutionary analyses are
supposed tomake rational decisions according to some subjective preference relation over
outcomes, where preference orderings are not ex-ante restricted to be monotonic in the
earnings from interactions as given by the earnings matrix. Competitive pressures then
operate on different preferences as embraced by different individuals, which allows to
rank preferences with respect to their relative success and thus to assess their evolutionary
viability in the given context.
The indirect evolutionary approach has of course been applied to the one-shot Prisoners’
Dilemma game. Yet introducing an “extra value” for cooperative behavior into some
players’ utilities, as in Ockenfels (1993) and Guttman (2000), does not per se facilitate the
evolution of altruism: As shown by these authors, the evolutionary viability of altruism
requires players who derive extra utility from cooperating to have reliable information (at
least in a probabilistic sense) about their opponent’s preference type in order to flourish.
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This finding relates nicely to the argument advanced by Robert Frank (see section 4.1),
but do not speak to anonymous interactions and is therefore of limited relevance in the
context taken up here.
To set the scene for what will be proposed in the next sections it is instructive to note
that the models by Ockenfels and by Guttman have all players act rationally, the only
difference between cooperators and defectors being cooperator’s transformed utility
functions which include extra values for cooperative behavior. In fact, most indirect
evolutionary analyses share the logic that all players are taken to make rational choices
in the sense of maximizing expected utility, with surprisingly few exceptions (like e. g.
Banerjee &Weibull (1994) and Sethi 1996). The model to be developed here adds to the
number of these exceptions as it accommodates agents of the ’rational’ and hard-wired
type alike. By allowing for informed decision-making in parts of the population and for
programmed actions in others, the model will allow to simultaneously consider learning
and imitation on the one hand and differential survival and reproduction on the other.
Both mechanisms imply that behaviors which earn above average grow at the expense
of those with below-average performance, and are usually perceived by economists as
substitutes (in motivating the axiom of earnings monotonicity for utility functions) rather
than complements (in allowing for a richer model of social interactions). Anthropologists,
in contrast, have begun to argue that what happens in people’s minds and what happens
to people’s genes should be seen as a coevolutionary process (see the summary of recent
work in this area provided by Richerson & Boyd 2005). In other words, cultural and natural
selection interact.
The model to be proposed in the following section relates to the idea that cultural and
natural selection should be seen as complements. Yet unlike in the literature on cultural
group selection, very little reference will be made to the possibly different characteristics
of the cultural transmission and natural selection — see e. g. Henrich (2004) for exam-
ples of how the specific properties of cultural selection per se can foster cooperation by
reducing the within-group and increasing the between-group components of behavioral
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variance. Considering both natural selection and purposeful imitation in an indirect
evolutionary model with a mix of maximizing and hard-wired types will rather be taken
as an opportunity to assign each of the two selectionmechanisms a specific domain of
operation. This is important because religious involvement by believers will be argued
to differ in a specific regard from religious involvement by nonbelievers. The activity
concerned is of course the same, yet a difference resides in agents’ motivation to partake
in religious activities: Believers, by definition, engage in religion for its own sake, while for
nonbelievers religion is an instrument they ’use’ in order to attain some other ultimate
goal. Put shortly, believers are ’hard-wired’ to engage in religion and hence evolve by
natural selection, while nonbelievers ’culturally’ arrive at their maximization goal by
imitation and learning.
5.2 TheModel
Consider a society where a large number of players meet in pairs to engage in symmetric
PDs of the repeated one-shot type. Each period is long enough for individuals to engage in
the PD twice or spend half of their time in a religious community. Religious involvement
yields no earnings, so that in the latter case earnings are derived from interacting in the
PD once. The economic and the religious spheres are closely tied to each other in that
PD interactions occur only among individuals who are part of the religious community
on the one hand and among individuals who are not on the other hand, but not across
groups.
5.2.1 Agents
There are two dimensions to agents in this society: Their motivation with regard to
religious involvement and their (pure) strategy played in the PD. Agents are grouped into
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three categories with regard to their motivation for religious involvement:
1. Believerswho see religious activity as an end in itself and partake in religious activity
independently of any possible (proximate or ultimate) material rewards. In other
the words, these agents are “intrinsically motivated” (Deci & Ryan 1985) to be
involved in religion.
2. Opportunists inclined to use religious involvement as a means to an end, more
precisely as a way to achieve higher earnings in the PD interactions. These agents
have “extrinsic motivation”.
3. Ignoramuses who are repelled by religion so much that they avoid any possible
contact. With regard to religion they are nonmotivated.
Agents are genetically conditioned to either cooperate or defect in the PD as in socio-
biology. It has been argued above with reference to consistency in behavior that an
(individually costly) commitment to cooperate and a belief in (time-consuming yet ma-
terially unrewarding and hence costly) religious teachings and activity will plausibly
coincide. Believers are therefore taken to be cooperators — an assumption which is in
line with recent experimental results by Tan & Vogel (2005) who find that participants’
(self-reported) religiosity correlates heavily with both their trustworthiness and their
trusting behavior. The important qualification that religious involvement may after all
be rewarding in resource terms due to its possible signaling value is accounted for by
imputing a defective strategy to opportunists. Ignoramuses can safely be assumed to be
defectors.34
34As in many evolutionary analyses, the types (or, in this context, combinations of religious motivation
and PD strategies) not to be included in the model are at least as important for the results obtained as
the strategies which are. The crucial point here is of course that defecting believers are not admitted.
Leaving these types out of the model can be defended with reference to self-perception and cognitive
dissonance theories as in Sosis’s model (see section 4.4). It is even more legitimate to do so as the presence
of opportunists will ensure that results will not be driven by homogeneous groups.
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5.2.2 Timing
The model is in discrete time. More precisely, each generation g ∈ [1,∞) comprises a
finite number of N > 1 interaction periods indexed by t ∈ [1,N ] as illustrated in figure 5.1.
g
  2  3     4
t = N t = N t = N1 1 1 1
  1
  t
Figure 5.1: Dual Time Axes
The breakdown of generations to interaction periods is essential to the model as it allows
to assign separate domains to natural selection on the one hand and to conscious learning
on the other: Conscious learning and imitation are taken to go on from period to period
(within generations), while natural selection operates from generation to generation. This
amounts to the (intuitive) conjecture that evolution by learning is faster than by natural
selection.
5.2.3 Earnings of Individuals
Let p j ,g denote the proportion of individuals of type j present in generation g and
consider the interaction period indexed by t ∈ [1,N ] in this generation. Individuals’
earnings depend, of course, on which group they are in and on the composition of
groups. While believers (type 1) and ignoramuses (type 3) are unambiguously inside and
outside of the religious community during the entire generation, respectively, let p21,t ,g
and p23,t ,g = p2,g −p21,t ,g denote the population proportions of opportunists who are
inside and outside of the religious community in interaction period t of generation g ,
respectively. This distinction is necessary because not all opportunist have joined the
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community by any given period within a generation. Unlike with (intrinsically motivated)
believers, two prerequisites must instead be fulfilled: Being in the religious groupmust be
worthwhile for an opportunist in resource terms and, equally important, she must have
made up her mind to become aware of that fact. Average earnings of individuals with this
distinction read
E1,t ,g =
(
p1,g
p1,g +p21,t ,g
)
R+
(
p21,t ,g
p1,g +p21,t ,g
)
S,
E21,t ,g =
(
p1,g
p1,g +p21,t ,g
)
T +
(
p21,t ,g
p1,g +p21,t ,g
)
P,
E3,t ,g ≡ E23,t ,g = 2P ∀t ,g .
(Notice that ∀p1,g ,p21,t ,g , E21,t ,g > E1,t ,g reflecting the dominant-strategy property of the
PD where T >R > P > S.)
5.2.4 Opportunists’ Within-Generation Dynamics
In the model it is assumed that natural selection operates only from generation to gen-
eration. What evolves within a generation is the population ratio of opportunists who
have joined the religious group by the interaction period indexed by t , p21,t ,g (recall that
believers are assumed to be in the religious group at all times within a generation just like
ignoramuses are outside).
A plausible equation of motion reflecting the dynamics which arise from opportunists’
decision-making in period t will be argued to be
p21,t=1,g = 0 ∀g ,
p21,t+1,g =min
{
p21,t ,g +α
(
p1,g +p21,t ,g
)
,p2,g
}
, α ∈ (0,1) if E21,t+1,g > E23 ≡ E3 = 2P,
p21,t+1,g = p21,t ,g otherwise.
These dynamics, of course, merit discussion with respect to at least two aspects. First,
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it is advocated that opportunists — unlike believers who engage in religious activity for
the sake of its own — are not present in the religious group at the beginning of each
generation. In fact, why should they? For opportunists to enter the religious milieu in
view of the profit opportunities reflected by E21,t+1,g > E23, they must be aware of the
high-altruism qualities of the community. This information is taken to be not inherited
from opportunists in g − 1. This is crucial for the model but in line with the finding
in evolutionary biology that characteristics acquired during an animal’s lifetime is not
inherited by its offspring. ’Lamarckian inheritance’ e. g. was disproved by genetics, see
e. g. Futuyma (1998, p. 18f).35 Opportunists must as a consequence learn about the
exploitation gains from religious involvement in each generation anew, p21,t=1,g = 0 ∀g .
The second issue relates to the speed of opportunists’ inflow into the religious commu-
nity. Here it is natural to assume that the larger (and hence more visible) the church—
measured by p1,g +p21,t ,g — the more opportunists learn of the religion’s signaling value
in each period. The earnings differential E21,t+1,g −E23 is taken to be relevant only with
regard to its sign: Opportunists who get aware of the religion-altruism link will enter the
church as long as the gains to be achieved through such a move are positive, independent
of their magnitude. Opportunists’ inflow into the religious community terminates when
a generation ends, when an additional dose of opportunists would push their within-
church earnings below the level to be earned outside or when all opportunists have joined
the community, depending on what happens first.
Figures 5.2 - 5.4 all give an impression of the initially convex shape which results when
plotting p21 against the within-generation time axis t . In figure 5.2, a generation lasts suf-
ficiently long and the gains from exploitation remain sufficiently high for all opportunists
to make their way into the religious community, whereas the generation in figure 5.3 ends
before all opportunists get involved in religion. In figure 5.4, opportunists have enough
35On a side note, the author knows of parents in the process of raising children who strongly agree
(the parents, not the children). See however e. g. Jablonka & Lamb (1995) for the concept of “epigenetic
inheritance” of non DNA-encoded characteristics by cells.
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time on their hands but elect not to exhaust it: Due to the small fraction of believers in
this plot, the cooperative milieu deteriorates to an extent that lets opportunists’ inflow
run dry before the generation ends.
p 2
t
p 21,t
t = N 11
Figure 5.2: Opportunists’ Within-Generation Dynamics (“Long” Generation)
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t
p 21,t
t = N 11
Figure 5.3: Opportunists’ Within-Generation Dynamics (“Short” Generation)
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Figure 5.4: Opportunists’ Within-Generation Dynamics (“Lack” of Believers)
Figures 5.2 - 5.4 each depict a single generation. Only the early interaction periods of the
subsequent generation are indicated. This is because generations in the convergence
process differ from one another with regard to population ratios. The next section details.
5.2.5 Natural Selection
Natural selection by differential survival and reproduction intervenes at the end of each
generation, i. e. after N interaction periods. A convenient ’accounting level’ for fitness
differences in the society is types’ (cumulated) earnings. While per-period earnings
of types are identical to individuals’ earnings for believers and ignoramuses, a typical
opportunist’s earnings in period t must take into account the fraction of opportunists
who are within and who are without the community. Types’ per-period earnings hence
read
Eˆ1,t ,g ≡ E1,t ,g ,
Eˆ2,t ,g =
(
p21,t ,g
p2,g
)
E21,t ,g +
(
p23,t ,g
p2,g
)
E23, and
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Eˆ3,t ,g ≡ E3,t ,g = 2P ∀t ,g .
Types’ cumulated earningsΠi ,g in generation g can then be computed as
Π j ,g :=
N∑
t=1
(
1
1+δ
)t−1
Eˆ j ,t ,g , j = 1,2,3,
where δ≥ 0 is a discount rate reflecting the possible fact that earnings realized earlier in
life play a disproportionately important role.
Natural selection’s workings on types are modeled by standard discrete-time replicator
dynamics (see e. g. Weibull 1995, p. 123):
p j ,g+1 = p j ,g ·
Π j ,g
Π¯g
, j = 1,2,3,
where Π¯g :=Σ3j=1p j ,gΠ j ,g is theweighted population average of types’ cumulated earnings
in generation g .
5.3 Simulation Studies
The society outlined above is currently implemented as a computational model in Micro-
soft® Visual Basic for inductively analyzing its dynamical properties. In particular, the
evolution of the population proportion of types, p j ,g , can be studied for different initial
conditions p j ,g=1 (of course satisfying Σ3j=1p j = 1) and different parameter values such as
N , α, δ, and for different earnings matrices. Some simulation results are reported in what
follows.
Concerning the evolution of within-group altruistic cooperation, the most important
finding is that believers and opportunists can coexist in long-run equilibrium provided
that the effect of believers’ initial advantage of an intermittently intact religious milieu is
strong enough. For a ’benchmark’ case, payoffs are taken to be T = 13,R = 11,P = 3,S = 1,
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which implies a cost-benefit ratio of cooperation of cb = 0.2. Moreover, N = 50, α =0.025,
and δ = 0.01.
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Figure 5.5: T = 13, R = 11, P = 3, S = 1, N = 50, α =0.025, δ = 0.01
From an initially even distribution of types in the population, the society evolves to a
long-run equilibrium where believers and opportunists coexist while the frequency of
ignoramuses reduces to zero.
An important question to ask at this point relates of course to the robustness of these
findings with regard to changes in initial conditions. A simulation run with different
initial proportions was therefore conducted. In Figure 5.6, p1,g=1 = 0.1, p2,g=1 = 0.8 and
p3,g=1 = 0.1.
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Figure 5.6: Irrelevance of Initial Conditions
Inspection of figure 5.5 and 5.6 suggests that the long-run distribution of types is indepen-
dent of initial conditions. As for the convergence process, all types evolve monotonically
in figure 5.6 whereas believers initially spread (for a short while) and subsequently decline
towards their long-run proportion in figure 5.5. The non-monotonic shape in this fig-
ure results from the fact that believers’ initial proportion is higher than their long-run
ratio in this exercise on the one hand and from the replicator dynamics on the other:
Opportunists as long as present in the population push down the average earnings to an
extent that both believers along with opportunists earn above average in early stages of
the simulation. Believers can hence for a short while grow in proportion before dropping
(slightly) below their initial level.
Simulation studies make it possible to trace not only the evolution of population ratios
with regard to types but equally the shape of opportunists’ inflow into the religious
community — which had been illustrated for single generations in figures 5.2 - 5.4 —
across multiple generations.
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Figure 5.7: Opportunists’ Inflow into Religious Community
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Figure 5.7 depicts how opportunists make their way into the church for (initially) non-
consecutive generations such that the differences between early and later generations
become visible: Early in the simulation, opportunists flow into the religious community
rather slowly, and the inflow runs dry before a generation ends. Both the moderate speed
and the premature stop of opportunists’ inflow are due to a small initial population
proportion of believers, which amounts to only p1,g=1 = 0.1. Believers can spread at the
cost of opportunists, whose aggressiveness is initially moderate. Due to the expanding
size of the church, opportunists can in later generations catch up as they flow into the
communitymore andmore quickly and for longer periods of time. The process eventually
equilibrates in a state where opportunists flow into the church at a speed which in this
case allows all opportunists to spend part of a generation in the church.
How does the model respond to changes in parameter values? Consider the next simula-
tion run where all parameters are as in Figures 5.5 and 5.12, expect for the “length” of a
generation which is taken to be 60 instead of 50 interactions.
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Figure 5.8: T = 13, R = 11, P = 3, S = 1, N = 60, α =0.025, δ = 0.01
As expected, the long-run equilibriumproportion of believers is lower than in the previous
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figures because opportunists have more time to catch up on believers’ initial advantage
in each generation.
The discount rate δ plays an intuitive role here. When repeating the two previous exercises
with δ = 0.02 instead of 0.01 the equilibrium proportions of believers are p1 = 0.46 for
N = 50 and p1 = 0.37 for N = 60, which both exceed the values for the cases where δ =
0.01. A higher discount rate clearly favors believers.
The next run illustrates the significance of opportunists’ learning speed. Parameters differ
from the ’benchmark’ case in that α= 0.04. In this case, opportunists’ learning occurs at a
speed such that believers are asymptotically crowded out. In this situation, opportunists
are behaviorally indistinguishable from the ignoramuses who survive in the long run.
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Figure 5.9: T = 13, R = 11, P = 3, S = 1, N = 50, α =0.04, δ = 0.01
Unlike long-run outcomes where believers survive along with opportunists, the outcome
in figure 5.9 is associated with its initial conditions of equal representation of types in
the population: Simulations of the same parameters yet with different initial population
proportions (not shown) suggest that the long-run proportion of opportunists increases
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with ceteris paribus a higher initial proportion of believers (to feed on during convergence)
on the one hand and with a lower initial proportion of ignoramuses on the other hand.
Believers are crowded out in figure 5.9 because opportunists learn too fast given the other
parameters. One way to illustrate the interplay of all model parameters is to increase the
discount factor to δ = 0.03, leaving all other parameters constant (including α = 0.04).
This exercise results in long-run population proportions of p1 = 0.22, p2 = 0.78, p3 = 0
(not shown).
The model can similarly be inspected for its response to changes in the earnings matrix.
In the above simulations, earnings were T = 13, R = 11, P = 3, S = 1. As expected, results
do not change when all earnings are multiplied by some positive number. This is not
true, however, in the case of a constant being added to (or deducted from) all earnings.
Consider the next diagram which depicts a simulation run where — as in the ’benchmark’
case — N = 50, α = 0.025, δ = 0.01 but where earnings are T = 12.5, R = 10.5, P = 2.5,
S = 0.5. This transformation preserves the cost-benefit ratio of cb = 0.2, yet the long-run
distribution of types differs from the ’benchmark’ case:
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Figure 5.10: cb = 0.2, N = 50, α= 0.025, δ= 0.01 as in ’Benchmark’ Case but Higher RP
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The transformed earnings matrix — which has a higher ratio of the earnings frommutual
cooperation to those from mutual defection than in the ’benchmark’ case — favors
cooperators. In contrast, believers disappear in the case (not shown) T = 17, R = 15, P = 7,
S = 5. In this case, the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation is again 0.2 as in the ’benchmark’
case, yet the low ratio RP disfavors believers.
As for a change in the cost-benefit ratio cb , the model reacts as expected. Consider the
last simulation run to be reported, where T = 12.5, R = 11, P = 3, S = 1.5. With these
earnings RP = 113 as in the ’benchmark’ case, yet the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation is only
c
b ' 0.158 and hence smaller than in the ’benchmark’ case. This clearly favors believers,
as is obvious from figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.11: RP = 113 , N = 50, α= 0.025, δ= 0.01 as in ’Benchmark’ Case but Lower cb
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5.4 Exploring theModel
The simulation studies reported in the previous section indicate that the society under
study accommodates basically two types of long-run equilibria, depending on the relative
importance of believers’ initial advantage within generations: Coexistence of either believ-
ers and opportunists or (behaviorally indistinguishable) opportunists and ignoramuses.
This section further explores the nature of the first, and more interesting, equilibrium
of believers and opportunists. A robustness check with regard to the specification of
opportunists’ within-generation dynamic will be performed afterwards.
5.4.1 Equilibrium Properties
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 suggest that long-run population ratios in outcomes with believers
and opportunists do not depend on initial conditions. As is evident from figure 5.12, such
invariance extends to the case where opportunists rather than getting crowded out by
believers and opportunists in the course of time are absent right from the start.
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Figure 5.12: ’Benchmark’ Case as in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 but p3,g=1,... = 0
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The presence of ignoramuses is hence irrelevant for the long-run distribution of types
in equilibria with believers and opportunists. Uniqueness and stability of the two types’
long-run distribution are illustrated in figure 5.13, which provides a phase diagram—
disregarding ignoramuses — for the ’benchmark’ case with p3,g=1 = 0.
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Figure 5.13: Phase Diagram for ’Benchmark’ Case (p3,g=1,... = 0)
Plotting believers’ advantage in cumulative discounted earnings against their population
proportion, the graph intersects the abscissa once and from above, thereby manifesting
uniqueness and global36 stability. The phase diagram can also be inspected with regard
to parameter changes in order to corroborate the comparative statics exercises reported
in the previous section: Plotting the graph for different parameter settings reveals that
ceteris paribus increases in N , α, and cb move the stationary value of p1 inward. Decreases
in these variables just like increases in δ or RP on the contrary move the stationary value of
p1 to the right. As it turns out, drastic parameter changes disfavoring believers can push
the entire graph below the abscissa and provide for an equilibrium with opportunists and
ignoramuses. Moving the entire graph above the abscissa is however beyond the power of
36Of course, global here refers to an initial proportion of believers which satisfies 0< p1,g=1 < 1.
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believer-friendly changes, leaving no hope for a monomorphic equilibriumwith believers
only.
What is the nature of this finding? In figure 5.7 a flavor was given as for the equilibrating
qualities of the particular dynamics governing opportunists’ inflow into the religious
community: Starting from a population with a relatively small proportion of believers
and hence poor visibility of the church, believers can spread in the population because of
opportunists’ limited aggressiveness. As the fraction of believers grows (and the church
becomes more visible due to its increasing size from the beginning of each generation),
opportunists’ inflow speed increases and hence narrows down the gap in cumulative
earnings. Figures 5.14 - 5.16 confirm this intuition in terms of resources by plotting types’
per-period earnings within a generation for different population ratios of believers and
opportunists (parameters correspond again to the ’benchmark’ case).
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Figure 5.14: Per-Period Earnings of Types, p1 = 0.3, p2 = 0.7
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Figure 5.15: Per-Period Earnings of Types, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5
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Figure 5.16: Per-Period Earnings of Types, p1 = 0.7, p2 = 0.3
For relatively small p1 (such as in figure 5.14), believers’ earnings stay above opportunists’
type-level earnings until roughly t = 19. With growing p ! the point of intersection of
believers’ and opportunists’ earnings is shifted towards the beginning of generations:
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While the (nonlinear, although not obvious from the diagrams) declining portion of
the earnings trajectory for believers is unaffected by changing population ratios, type-
level earnings for opportunists increase at a higher rate the larger the church, which
compromises believers’ initial advantage.
5.4.2 Model Robustness
The specification of opportunists’ within-generation dynamics advocated in section 5.2.4
clearly stabilizes the model and contributes to the uniqueness of equilibria with believers
and opportunists. This section explores the role played by the specific dynamics of
opportunists’ inflow into the religious community by adopting a more parsimonious
specification for the purpose of comparison: Rather than having opportunists’ inflow
speed depend positively on the size of the church, opportunists are taken to learn about
the exploitation gains to be made in the religious community (as long as applicable) at a
constant rate. Opportunists’ within-generation dynamics then become
p21,t=1,g = 0 ∀g ,
p21,t+1,g =min
{
p21,t ,g +β,p2,g
}
, β ∈ (0,p2,g ) if E21,t+1,g > E23 ≡ E3 = 2P,
p21,t+1,g = p21,t ,g otherwise.
The implications of this modification become clear when plotting a phase diagram with
p3,g=1 = 0 for again the ’benchmark’ parameter values (except for β = 0.003). Figure
5.17 reveals that coexistence of believers and opportunists remains a (if only locally)
stable equilibrium outcome also with these dynamics and hence does not depend on
the specification advocated in section 5.2.4. Yet a second (unstable) equilibrium of the
same type arises along with a third (locally stable) long-run outcome where believers get
crowded out. Simulation studies indicate that the stable equilibrium with believers is
reached equally for p3,g=1 > 0 as long as p1,g=1 is larger than the value where the graph in
figure 5.17 crosses the abscissa from below.
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Figure 5.17: Phase Diagram for Alternative Specification (p3,g=1,... = 0)
A different modification of opportunists’ within-generation dynamics is to deprive them
of their capacity to steer clear of the religious community when it no longer pays to join, i.
e. to consider the specification
p21,t=1,g = 0 ∀g ,
p21,t+1,g =min
{
p21,t ,g +α
(
p1,g +p21,t ,g
)
,p2,g
}
, α ∈ (0,1) .
This modification is innocuous when parameter values provide for an equilibrium where
each and every opportunist finds it worthwhile to join the religious community anyway,
like in figure 5.7. Consider however the simulation run of the modified dynamics in figure
5.18.
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Figure 5.18: Ill-informed Opportunists (Parameters as in Figure 5.8)
Figure 5.18 has the same parameter values as figure 5.8, where believers and opportunists
coexist in the long run. Yet by flowing into the religious community not only up to
but also beyond the point where religious involvement no longer pays, ’ill-informed’
opportunists pave the road to ruin first for believers and then for themselves. The long
run sees ignoramuses take over the population. Given parameter constellations like this
one, believers hence benefit from opportunists’ artfulness. From believers’ point of view,
opportunists had better live up to their name and be smart if opportunismmust be dealt
with in the first place.
5.5 Summary and Discussion
Signaling by religious involvement is proposed as a group selectionmechanism to sustain
altruistic cooperation as modeled by the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma. The main finding
is that cooperators (believers in the model) and defectors (opportunists) can coexist
in long-run evolutionary equilibrium. The crucial point consists in believers’ material
advantage over opportunists which derives precisely from the non-material nature of their
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motivation for religious involvement. Defectors can mimic the signal sent by cooperators,
but — borrowing the term from Frank (1988, p. 60) — only with delay. In this model, the
delay results from their opportunistic motivation to use religion instrumentally: Unlike
believers who see religious involvement as an end in itself, they have to learn of the
exploitation gains from religious involvement during a generation before attaining them.
The dual time axes of interaction periods and generations introduced in the model relate
to the “two-tiered dynamic process” envisioned in the indirect evolutionary analysis in
Güth & Kliemt (1998). While these authors assume that “overall evolutionary success is
in the last resort determined by the payoffs earned after adaptation has taken place and
is not distorted by what happens in the adaptation phase itself”, opportunists’ within-
generation dynamics are crucial to themodel at hand: If opportunists’ delay is sufficiently
important, believers and opportunists coexist in the long run. Simulation studies suggest
that the model responds to parameter changes in intuitive ways.
To avoid misunderstandings and possible offense it should be emphasized that no theory
of religion is intended here, although researchers since Azzi & Ehrenberg (1975) have
inquired about the economics of religion both theoretically and empirically (see Ian-
naccone (1998) for a survey and Barro &McCleary (2003) for recent empirical work on
the interaction of religion and economic growth). Neither does the model address the
evolutionary origins of religion as such or its possible adaptive value (see Boyer (2001)
andWilson (2002) for such analyses). Religion is rather taken as illustration of an activity
which (i) does not offer a proximate (net) reward in resource terms but is (ii) appealing
for non-material (i. e. not convertible into earnings) reasons of its own. Volunteering,
honorary offices and charity also come to mind.
Chapter 6
Epilogue
This piece of work is about the evolutionary viability of cooperative play in one-shot Pris-
oners’ Dilemma situations. The precarious nature of cooperation has kept evolutionary
biologists occupied for ages, and economists — as soon as they leave the cosy world of
general equilibrium with ideally functioning markets — naturally share their concern.
After all, both disciplines tend to operate on a maximization hypothesis which implies
that it is successful rather than unsuccessful behavior which will prevail in competitive
settings, and cooperating in the Prisoners’ Dilemma puts the individual in the latter
category. Yet the task is maybe easier for economists, who deal with human societies.
Humans’ capacity to remember faces and prudently deliberate over costs and benefits
allows economists to invoke the “shadow of the future” and argue thatmutual cooperation
can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in the iterated version of the game.
Such reasoning was shown to be problematic on both theoretical and empirical grounds
in Chapter 2: On the one hand, it was argued that classical game theorists’ treatment of
backward induction and coordination problems leaves much to be desired. On the other
hand, the repeated-game argument has no bite when it comes to sporadic interactions.
Yet modernmarket economies lean heavily towards depersonalization and tend to rely on
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anonymous transactions in — possibly imperfect —markets. Whenever the goods and
services traded in these markets do not live up to the neoclassical ideal of perfect homo-
geneity (the same goes of course for the integrity of market participants), transactional
problems arise and take the form of the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Both the lessons to be learned from the repeated-game approach and the special interest
in the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma were taken on board in Chapter 3, along with biol-
ogists’ approach towards the problem. Biologists refer to cooperation in the one-shot
Prisoners’ Dilemma as an act of altruism and wonder at the evolutionary survival of a
behavior which benefits competitors in the fitness race at a cost to the donors. Group se-
lection was offered as an approach to this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. Group (or
multi-level) selection clears the view to appreciate fitness penalties incurred by altruists
within subpopulations regardless of altruists’ evolutionary viability at the population level.
If group selection hence provides a theoretical framework for meaningful analyses of
(within-group) altruism, the question remained of how tomake the group effect work and
be sustained in plausible ways, especially in human societies where canonical haystack
models are out of place.
Chapter 4 took up the task and highlighted the possible role of signaling in achieving the
between-group variance in behavior which is necessary for the group selection effect.
“Telltale clues” were reviewed and reported to endogenously acquire and retain their
indicative value in competitive settings when interactions are ex-ante embedded to a
sufficiently high extent. In search of a possible factor of such embeddedness, sources
were followed which focus on membership in one of Max Weber’s Protestant Sects, or on
the signaling value of religious involvement in general.
The central message of this piece of work, developed in Chapter 5, is the following:
The religion example of signaling lends itself as an avenue to the evolution of altruism
in competitive settings also when church membership is viewed as the outcome of a
cost-benefit trade-off accessible to cooperators and defectors alike. Cooperators, taken
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to believe in religion and view religious involvement as an end in itself, benefit from
and during the time lead they have with regard to religious involvement. The time lag
disfavoring opportunistic defectors, who in fact notice of the instrumental qualities
inherent in religious involvement when it comes to maximizing their wealth, follows
naturally from the fact that imitation andmimicry refer to behaviors which already exist.
This mechanism depends of course on the type of agents which is not admitted to the
picture: Those who see religion as an end in itself and simultaneously defect in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Psychological regularities such as self-attribution and cognitive
dissonance theories were invoked for a justification of leaving such ’split personalities’
out.
The argument developed in Chapter 5 is of course highly stylized, and religion should only
be understood as an illustration, as emphasized in section 5.5. What has been proposed is
a group selection mechanism to accommodate the evolution of (within-group) altruism.
Such arguments are called for if one does not wish to follow the example of evolutionary
biologist John Haldane, whose “personal view of the world was that altruism is rare in
humans and other animals, so he was content to drop the subject.” (Sober & Wilson 1998,
p. 65, their italics). This seems unnecessary. After all, the evidence to the contrary is
immense. Fortunately.
Bibliography
ALCHIAN, ARMEN. 1950. Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of Political
Economy, 58(3), 211–222.
ALCHIAN, ARMEN, & DEMSETZ, HAROLD. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.
ALEXANDER, RICHARD D. 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
ARROW, KENNETH. 1974. The Limits Of Organization. New York and London: W.W. Norton
& Co.
ASHLOCK, DAN, SMUCKER, MARK D., STANLEY, E. ANN, & TESFATSION, LEIGH. 1996. Pref-
erential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner’s Dilemma. BioSystems,
37, 99–125.
AUMANN, ROBERT J. 1959. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative q-Person Games.
Pages 287–324 of: LUCE, R. D., & TUCKER, A. W. (eds), Contributions to the Theory of
Games IV. Annals of Mathematics Studies, vol. 40. Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press.
AXELROD, ROBERT. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
AZZI, CORRY, & EHRENBERG, RONALD. 1975. Household Allocation of Time and Church
Attendance. Journal of Political Economy, 83(1), 27–56.
86
BIBLIOGRAPHY 87
BANERJEE, ABHIJIT, & WEIBULL, JÖRGEN W. 1994. Evolutionary Selection and Rational Be-
havior. Chap. 12, pages 343–363 of: KIRMAN, ALAN, & SALMON, MARK (eds), Rationality
and Learning in Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
BARRO, ROBERT, & MCCLEARY, RACHEL. 2003. Religion and Economic Growth. NBER
Working Paper No. 9682.
BENDOR, JONATHAN, & SWISTAK, PIOTR. 1997. The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation.
American Political Science Review, 91(2), 290–307.
BERG, JOYCE, DICKHAUT, JOHN, & MCCABE, KEVIN. 1995. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social
History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142.
BERGSTROM, THEODORE C. 2002. Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group
Selection. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 67–88.
BERGSTROM, THEODORE C. 2003. The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution
of Cooperation. International Game Theory Review, 5, 1–18.
BICKEL, PETER J., HAMMEL, EUGENE A., & O’CONNELL, J. W. 1975. Sex Bias in Graduate
Admissions: Data From Berkeley. Science, 187, 398–404.
BINMORE, KEN. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 1: Playing Fair.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
BOUDON, RAYMOND. 1987. The Individualistic Tradition in Sociology. Chap. 1, pages
45–70 of: ALEXANDER, JEFFREY C., GIESEN, BERNHARD, MÜNCH, RICHARD, & SMELSER,
NEIL J. (eds), The Micro-Macro Link. Berkeley: University of California Press.
BOYER, PASCAL. 2001. Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought.
New York: Basic Books.
COHEN, DAN, & ESHEL, ILAN. 1976. On the Founder Effect and the Evolution of Altruistic
Traits. Theoretical Population Biology, 10, 276–302.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 88
COOK, KAREN S., TOSHIO, YAMAGISHI, COYE, CHESHIRE, COOPER, ROBIN, MATSUDA,
MASAFUMI, & MASHIMA, RIE. 2005. Trust Building via Risk Taking: A Cross-Societal
Experiment. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68, 121–142.
COOPER, BEN, & WALLACE, CHRIS. 2004. Group Selection and the Evolution of Altruism.
Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 307–330.
DARWIN, CHARLES. 1874. The Descent of Man; and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2nd edn.
New York: Crowell.
DAWKINS, RICHARD. 1989. The Selfish Gene. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DECI, EDWARD L., & RYAN, RICHARDM. 1985. IntrinsicMotivation and Self-Determination
in Human Behavior. New York: Plenum Press.
EKMAN, PAUL. 2002. Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Marriage, and Politics.
3rd edn. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co.
FARRELL, JOSEPH, & WARE, ROGER. 1989. Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Theoretical Population Biology, 36, 161–166.
FIELD, ALEXANDER J. 2001. Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary
Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
FLETCHER, JEFFREY A., & ZWICK, MARTIN. 2000. Simpson’s Paradox Can Emerge from
the N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for the Evolution of Altruistic Behavior.
In: ALLEN, J. K., & WILBY, J. M. (eds), Proceedings of The WorldCongress of the Systems
Sciences and ISSS 2000. Toronto, Canada: International Society for the Systems Sciences.
FRANK, ROBERT H. 1987. If Homo Economicus Could Choose His OwnUtility Function,
Would HeWant One with a Conscience? American Economic Review, 77, 593–604.
FRANK, ROBERT H. 1988. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New
York and London: W. W. Norton & Co.
FRANK, ROBERT H. 1994. Group Selection and "Genuine" Altruism. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 17, 620–621.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 89
FRANK, ROBERT. H., GILOVICH, TOM, & REGAN, DENISE. 1993. The Evolution of One-Shot
Cooperation - an Experiment. Ethology and Sociobiology, 14(4), 247–256.
FRIEDMAN, JAMES W. 1971. A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames. Review of
Economic Studies, 38(1), 1–12.
FRIEDMAN, MILTON. 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
FUTUYMA, DOUGLAS J. 1998. Evolutionary Biology. 3rd edn. Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer
Associates.
GALE, DAVID, & SHAPLEY, LLOYD S. 1962. College Admission and the Stability of Marriage.
American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9–15.
GAUTHIER, DAVID. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
GÜTH, WERNER, & KLIEMT, HARTMUT. 1998. The Indirect Evolutionary Approach: Bridg-
ing the Gap between Rationality and Adaptation. Rationality and Society, 10(3), 377–
399.
GÜTH, WERNER, & YAARI, MENAHEM. 1992. Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple
Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach. Pages 23–34 of: WITT, ULRICH (ed),
Explaining Process and Change - Approaches to Evolutionary Economics. Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press.
GUTTMAN, JOEL M. 2000. On the Evolutionary Stability of Preferences for Reciprocity.
European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 31–50.
HAMILTON, WILLIAM D. 1963. The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior. American Naturalist,
97, 354–356.
HAUK, ESTHER. 2001. Leaving the Prison: Permitting Partner Choice and Refusal in
Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Computational Economics, 18, 65–87.
HENRICH, JOSEPH. 2004. Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-
Scale Cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53(1), 3–35.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 90
HOLLAND, JOHN H. 1975. Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press.
HRUSCHKA, DANIEL J., & HENRICH, JOSEPH. 2006. Friendship, Cliquishness, and the
Emergence of Cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 239, 1–15.
IANNACCONE, LAURENCE R. 1998. Introduction to the Economics of Religion. Journal of
Economic Literature, 36, 1465–1496.
IRONS, WILLIAM. 2001. Religion as a Hard-to-Fake Sign of Commitment. Chap. 13, pages
292–309 of: NESSE, RANDOLPH M. (ed), Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
JABLONKA, EVA, & LAMB, MARION J. 1995. Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
JAMES, HARVEY S. JR. 2002. The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries into the
Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 47,
291–307.
KREPS, DAVID. 1990. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. Pages 90–143 of: ALT,
JAMES, & SHEPSLE, KENNETH (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
LORBERBAUM, JEFFREY P., BOHNING, DARYL E., SHASTRI, ANANDA, & SINE, LAUREN E.
2002. Are There Really No Evolutionary Stable Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma? Journal of Theoretical Biology, 214, 155–169.
MACY, MICHAEL W. 1998. Social Order in Artificial Worlds. Journal of Artificial Soci-
eties and Social Simulation, 1(1), available online at http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/
JASSS/1/1/4.html.
MACY, MICHAEL W., & SKVORETZ, JOHN. 1998. The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation
between Strangers: A Computational Model. American Sociological Review, 63, 638–
660.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 91
MARINOFF, LOUIS. 1990. The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41, 461–472.
MAYNARD SMITH, JOHN. 1964. Group Selection and Kin Selection. Nature, 201, 1145–1147.
MAYNARD SMITH, JOHN, & PRICE, GEORGE R. 1973. The Logic of Animal Conflict. Nature,
246, 15–18.
NORTH, DOUGLASS. 1984. Government and the Cost of Exchange in History. The Journal
of Economic History, 44(2), 255–264.
NOWAK, MARTIN A., & SIGMUND, KARL. 1998. Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image
Scoring. Nature, 393, 573–577.
OCKENFELS, PETER. 1993. Cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma - An Evolutionary Approach.
European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 567–579.
ORBELL, JOHN, & DAWES, ROBYN M. 1991. A "Cognitive Miser" Theory of Cooperators’
Advantage. American Political Science Review, 85(2), 515–528.
RADNER, ROY. 1980. Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of
Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 136–154.
REEVE, HUDSON KERNE. 2000. Multi-Level Selection and Human Cooperation. Review of
Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior by Elliott Sober and
David SloanWilson. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 65–72.
RICHERSON, PETER J., & BOYD, ROBERT. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Trans-
formed Human Evolution. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
SCHLICHT, EKKEHART. 1995. Economic Analysis and Organised Religion. Chap. 3, pages
111–162 of: JONES, ERIC, & REYNOLDS, VERNON (eds), Survival and Religion: Biological
Evolution and Cultural Change. New York: JohnWiley & Sons.
SCHLICHT, EKKEHART. 1998. On Custom in the Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 92
SCHLICHT, EKKEHART. 2002. Reflections and Diffractions. Schlicht Replies to His Critics.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 61(2), 571–594.
SCHÜSSLER, RUDOLF. 1989. Exit Threats and Cooperation Under Anonymity. Journal Of
Conflict Resolution, 33(4), 728–749.
SETHI, RAJIV. 1996. Evolutionary Stability and Social Norms. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 29, 113–140.
SIMPSON, E. H. 1951. The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, B13, 238–241.
SKYRMS, BRIAN. 2004. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
SOBER, ELLIOTT, & WILSON, DAVID SLOAN. 1998. Unto Others. The Evolution and Psychol-
ogy of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
SOSIS, RICHARD. 2003. WhyAren’tWeAll Hutterites? Costly Signaling Theory andReligious
Behavior. Human Nature, 14(2), 91–127.
SOSIS, RICHARD, & ALCORTA, CANDACE. 2003. Signaling, Solidarity, and the Sacred: The
Evolution of Religious Behavior. Evolutionary Anthropology, 12, 264–274.
SPENCE, MICHAEL. 1973. Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87,
355–374.
TABELLINI, GUIDO. 2005. Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions
of Europe. CESifo Working Paper No. 1492.
TAN, JONATHAN H. W., & VOGEL, CLAUDIA. 2005. Religion and Trust: An Experimen-
tal Study. European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business
Administration and Economics Discussion Paper No. 240.
TESFATSION, LEIGH. forthcoming. Agent-Based Computational Economics. In: LUNA,
FRANCESCO, PERRONE, ALLESSANDRO, & TERNA, PIETRO (eds), Agent-Based Theories,
Languages, and Practices. London and New York: Routledge Publishers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 93
TRIVERS, ROBERT L. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of
Biology, 46, 35–57.
TULLBERG, JAN. 2003. Rationality and Social Behavior. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 224,
469–478.
WEBER, MAX. 1970. The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism. Pages 302–322 of:
GERTH, HANS H., & MILLS, C. WRIGHT (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
WEIBULL, JÖRGEN W. 1995. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
WILLIAMS, GEORGE C. 1966. Adaptation andNatural Selection: A Critique of Some Current
Evolutionary Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
WILLIAMS, GEORGE C., & WILLIAMS, D. C. 1957. Natural Selection of Individually Harmful
Social Adaptations amongs Sibs with Special Reference to Social Insects. Evolution, 11,
32–39.
WILLIAMSON, OLIVER E. 1993. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. Jour-
nal of Law and Economics, 36(1), 453–486.
WILSON, DAVID SLOAN. 1987. Altruism inMendelian Populations Derived from Sibling
Groups: The Haystack Model Revisited. Evolution, 41, 1059–1070.
WILSON, DAVID SLOAN. 2002. Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of
Society. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
WRIGHT, SEWALL. 1945. Tempo and Mode in Evolution: A Critical Review. Ecology, 26,
415–419.
WYNNE-EDWARDS, VERO C. 1962. Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour.
Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.
ZAHAVI, AMOTZ. 1975. Mate Selection - Selection for a Handicap. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 53, 205–214.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
ZYWICKI, TODD J. 2000. “Was Hayek Right About Group Selection After All?“ Review Essay
of Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, by Elliott Sober
and David SloanWilson. Review of Austrian Economics, 13, 81–95.

Lebenslauf
Persönliche Angaben
Wolfgang Pfeuffer
geboren am 23. Juli 1974 in Ansbach
Schule
1980-1984 Grundschule in Estenfeld
1984-1993 Städt. Schönborn-Gymnasium inWürzburg
Abschluss: Allgemeine Hochschulreife
Zivildienst
1993-94 Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband
Bezirksverband Unterfranken, Geschäftsstelle Würzburg
Studium
1994-1995 Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Rechtswissenschaft (ohne Abschluss)
1995-2001 Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg
Studiengang Europäische Wirtschaft
Abschluss: Diplom-Volkswirt Univ. (Europa-Studiengang)
Promotion
seit 2002 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Promotionsstudium (bis 2006) an Volkswirtschaftlicher Fakultät
sowie wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
am Seminar für Theorie und Politik der Einkommensverteilung
München, 31. August 2006 Wolfgang Pfeuffer
